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Cited by 344

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence

Drago, Robert, Garvey, Gerald T.·1998·Journal of Labor Economics

Abstract

Recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers' performance through “helping” efforts. This article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation. The model is tested with Australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups. The evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced, while individual efforts are increased, when promotion incentives are strong. Piece rates and profit‐sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts, while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated.

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Metadata

Authors
Drago, R., & Garvey, G. T.
Venue
Journal of Labor Economics
Published
1998-01
Volume
16
Issue
1
Pages
1-25
ISSN
  • 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5307
OpenAlex
W2255601800
Cited by
344
References
30
FWCI
23.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/209880
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Drago, R., & Garvey, G. T. (1998). Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Labor Economics. https://doi.org/10.1086/209880

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.