The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence
Abstract
Recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers' performance through “helping” efforts. This article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation. The model is tested with Australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups. The evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced, while individual efforts are increased, when promotion incentives are strong. Piece rates and profit‐sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts, while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated.
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Cites
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Corporate culture and economic theory
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Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources
Lazear, E. P., & Shaw, K. L. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.4.91 · Cited by 470
The Principal's Other Problems: Honest Incompetence and the Specification of Objectives
Hendry, J. (2002) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/4134371 · Cited by 361
Kruse, D. L., Freeman, R. B., & Blasi, J. R. (2010) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226056968.001.0001 · Cited by 311
Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments
Chen, K.-P. (2003) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/19.1.119 · Cited by 246
Metadata
- Authors
- Drago, R., & Garvey, G. T.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1998-01
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-25
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W2255601800
- Cited by
- 344
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 23.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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