A World of States of Affairs
Abstract
In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts (or states of affairs, as the author calls them) the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy.
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An ontology that accepts points as objects should accept sets, classes, or mereological fusions of points.
“(a) An ontology that accepts points as objects should surely accept sets, classes, or mereological fusions, of points.”
From Noether's Theorems and Energy in General Relativity (2021) · cites this paper as Armstrong (1997: pp. 12-13)
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God
Foster, J. (2004) · Oxford University Press · doi:10.1093/0199250596.001.0001 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism and the Grounding Relation
Goff, P. (2019) · The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism · doi:10.4324/9781315717708-13 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
Noether's Theorems and Energy in General Relativity
De Haro, S. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2103.17160 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
- Authors
- Armstrong, D. M.
- Affiliations
- The University of Sydney (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Armstrong, D. M.
- Venue
- Nijhoff international philosophy series
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1997-03-06
- Volume
- 7
- Pages
- 159-171
- ISSN
- 0924-4530 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2050691920
- Cited by
- 2,022
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 81 · 2025: 130 · 2024: 69 · 2023: 53 · 2022: 74 · 2021: 69 · 2020: 95 · 2019: 144 · 2018: 94 · 2017: 71 · 2016: 98 · 2015: 54 · 2014: 74 · 2013: 81 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Nijhoff international philosophy series (publishedVersion)
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Philosophical Perspectives (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- states of affairs, facts, logical atomism, property, relations, numbers, class, necessity and possibility, dispositions, causality, laws of nature, metaphysics, David M. Armstrong
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