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Cited by 42Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhenomenology and Existential Philosophy

Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism and the Grounding Relation

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Goff, Philip·2019·The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism
DOI 10.4324/9781315717708-13
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Abstract

Constitutive micropsychism is the view that all facts are grounded in consciousness-involving facts at the micro-level. Constitutive cosmopsychism is the view that all facts are grounded in consciousness-involving facts concerning the universe. I argue that micropsychism is, whilst cosmopsychism is not, reliant on a deflationary account of facts concerning human and animal experience, and that because of this the former is a much less plausible view than the latter.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.4324/9781315717708-13

Cites

22 of 23 references verified0 citation errors · 1 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 11 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Premisereasoning
    § Why does the acceptance of the Necessity of Identity lead to the falsity of the Identity Analysis? Call

    To make sense of the grounding relation we need an account that removes the prima facie paradox by clarifying how nothing-over-and-aboveness can obtain between non-identical facts.

    “Thus, to make sense of the grounding relation we need to give some account that removes this prima facie paradox by clarifying how we can have nothing-overand-above-ness obtaining between non-identical facts.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Premisereasoning
    § The prima facie need for such a relation is given by reflection on examples:

    If X is identical with Y then X could not possibly exist without Y.

    “The Necessity of Identity -If X is identical with Y then X could not possibly exist without Y.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Interpretationreasoning
    § Abstract

    There are strong philosophical reasons for doubting physicalism.

    “There are strong philosophical reasons for doubting physicalism: The physical facts about my body and brain can wholly account for my conscious experience only if those physical facts necessitate the facts about my conscious experience.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The physical facts about my body and brain can wholly account for my conscious experience only if those physical facts necessitate the facts about my conscious experience.
    • Rests on an assumption: A world with a functioning body and brain physically identical to my own but with no consciousness is conceivable, in the sense of being rationally coherent.
    • Rests on an assumption: Conceivability of a world (rational coherence) gives good reason to think that world is possible.
  • Premisenone given
    § Abstract

    If there were fundamental mental properties in or associated with the brain that regularly impacted on the physical processes that govern behaviour, then this would show up in our neuroscience as physical changes in the brain that have no physical cause.

    “If there were fundamental mental properties in or associated with the brain that regularly impacted on the physical processes that govern behaviour, then this would show up in our neuroscience.We would find physical changes in the brain that have no physical cause.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Interpretationreasoning
    § Why does the acceptance of the Necessity of Identity lead to the falsity of the Identity Analysis? Call

    The Identity Analysis fails, at least in this case and any other case in which the fact that is grounded could obtain in the absence of the fact that grounds it.

    “Hence the Identity Analysis fails, at least in this case and any other case in which the fact that is grounded could obtain in the absence of the fact that grounds it.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 33
  • May combine two claims. 12

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Findingnone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    I have found nothing like such an alternative account in the literature so far.

    “I have found nothing like this in the literature so far, although to be fair the nature of the grounding relation has not thus far been much discussed in the panpsychism literature.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § Abstract

    If the physical facts about my brain necessitate the facts about my conscious experience, then there is no possible world in which there is a functioning body and brain physically identical to my own but in which there is no consciousness.

    “If the physical facts about my brain necessitate the facts about my conscious experience, then there is no possible world in which there is a functioning body and brain physically identical to my own but in which there is no consciousness.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Why does the acceptance of the Necessity of Identity lead to the falsity of the Identity Analysis? Call

    There are two options for satisfying the free lunch constraint, which lead to two distinct forms of the grounding relationship.

    “There seem to me two options for satisfying the free lunch constraint, which lead to two distinct forms of the grounding relationship.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § What is Grounding?

    The grounding relation is a non-causal explanatory relation that holds between facts.

    “The grounding relation is taken to be a non-causal explanatory relation that holds between facts.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Schaffer 2009 source
    • cites Rosen 2010 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Abstract

    Constitutive panpsychism offers hope of avoiding the dilemma between empirical reasons for doubting dualism and philosophical reasons for doubting physicalism.

    “By offering a non-physicalist reduction of human consciousness, constitutive panpsychism offers hope of avoiding this dilemma altogether.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisereasoning
    § The prima facie need for such a relation is given by reflection on examples:

    In cases of grounding, the product is nothing over and above the producer.

    “Intuitively in cases of grounding the product is nothing over and above the producer: we want to say that there is 'nothing more' to the fact that there is a party than the fact that certain people are revelling, or that the former 'wholly consists' in the latter.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    We know about the causal structure of matter through the way it impacts on our senses.

    “We know about the causal structure of matter through the way it impacts on our senses, and we know about (some of) the phenomenal properties instantiated by matter through direct acquaintance (i.e.we acquainted with the phenomenal properties instantiated by our own brains).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    We will probably never come to grasp the non-phenomenal aspects of consciousness+.

    “Will we ever come to grasp the non-phenomenal aspects of consciousness+?I am cautiously pessimistic.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    If we grasped the nature of consciousness+, we would understand that it is an essentially extended, causally efficacious property; as it is we grasp only one aspect of that property.

    “If we grasped the nature of consciousness+ we would understand that it is an essentially extended, causally efficacious property; as it is we grasp only one aspect of that property.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    The categorical nature of a conscious state does not seem to essentially involve causal power, as evidenced by the fact that epiphenomenalism is coherent.

    “Conscious subjects have causal powers, and yet the categorical nature of a conscious state does not seem to essentially involve causal power, as evidenced by the fact that epiphenomenalism is coherent.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisenone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    Cosmopsychism (in its constitutive form) is a combination of priority monism and panpsychism.

    “Cosmopsychism (in its constitutive form) is a combination of priority monism -discussed above -and panpsychism.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    Such optimism is dampened when one appreciates that, from Galileo onwards, the physical sciences have focused exclusively on mapping the causal structure of matter.

    “Such optimism is dampened when one appreciates that, from Galileo onwards, the physical sciences have focused exclusively on mapping the causal structure of matter.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    We cannot imagine a four-dimensional object by using our perceptual and/or introspective faculties, and we nonetheless take four-dimensional objects to be coherent.

    “But nor can we imagine in this way a four-dimensional object, and we nonetheless take four-dimensional objects to be coherent.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    It seems about as likely as the possibility of a blind scientist imagining her way to a positive conception of phenomenal red that we might reach a conception of the non-phenomenal categorical nature of matter through theoretical imagination.

    “Whilst I don't have an argument to conclusively rule this out, it seems to me about as likely as the possibility of a blind scientist imagining her way to a positive conception of phenomenal red.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [21] 21. Martin, C. B. 1980. 'Substance substantiated,' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58, 3-10. source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    Such a thing has no precedent in natural science, which has no interest in the non-phenomenal categorical nature of matter.

    “Certainly such a thing has no precedent in natural science, which has no interest in the non-phenomenal categorical nature of matter.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisenone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    According to cosmopsychism, my consciousness is an aspect of the consciousness of the universe.

    “According to cosmopsychism my consciousness is an aspect of the consciousness of the universe; this is consistent with supposing that my consciousness is part of the metaphysically privileged structure of reality.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    The fact that a theory entails our partial ignorance of the nature of matter does not give us any reason to doubt its truth.

    “But I don't think the fact that a theory has this implication gives us any reason to doubt its truth.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    We cannot imagine a subject-subsuming subject by using our perceptual and/or introspective faculties.

    “Certainly we cannot imagine such a thing by using our perceptual and/or introspective faculties.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    Once analytic functionalism is denied, there is no other way of analyzing the truth-conditions of propositions concerning o-consciousness in more fundamental terms.

    “But once we deny analytic functionalism, there doesn't seem to be any other way of analyzing the truth-conditions of propositions concerning o-consciousness in more fundamental terms.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    In the absence of an alternative account, micropsychism should be interpreted as construed above.

    “In the absence of some such alternative we should interpret micropsychism as I have construed it above.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    If micropsychism is true, then the metaphysical truth-conditions of propositions about o-consciousness concern micro-level conscious entities.

    “2. If micropsychism is true, then the metaphysical truth-conditions of propositions about oconsciousness concern micro-level conscious entities.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    If we are the products of natural selection rather than intelligent design, then we should not expect to be blessed with the capacity to discover the complete fundamental nature of reality.

    “If we are the products of natural selection rather than intelligent design, then we should not expect to be blessed with the capacity to discover the complete fundamental nature of reality.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Premisecitation
    § Grounding by subsumption between substantival space and its regions

    None of the other proposals in the literature for how to account for nothing-over-and-aboveness in the absence of identity is satisfactory.

    “There are other proposals in the literature for how to account for nothing-over-and-aboveness in the absence of identity; I have argued elsewhere that none is satisfactory.16”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [16] 16. Heil, J. 2003. From an Ontological Point of View, Oxford: Clarendon Press. source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    Any alternative construal of micropsychism would require formulating some other account of grounding that incorporates some other way of making sense of o-conscious minds being 'nothing over and above' facts about micro-level minds.

    “However, this would require formulating some other account of grounding, an account that incorporates some other way of making sense of o-conscious minds being 'nothing over and above' facts about micro-level minds.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisenone given
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    On cosmopsychism, the universe considered as a whole is a conscious subject of some kind.

    “On this view the universe considered as a whole is a conscious subject of some kind.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § Appendix: Demystifying Metaphysical Elitism

    Sider invests in a non-comparative notion of privilege, whereas a comparative notion of privilege is needed for the theoretical uses to which Sider wants to put this notion.

    “Sider invests in a non-comparative notion of privilege -concepts either carve nature at the joints or they don't -whereas it is a comparative notion of privilege that seems to be needed for the theoretical uses to which Sider wants to put this notion, for example, in accounting for laws of nature and the determinacy of reference.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [23] 23. Nagasawa, Y. & Wager, K. Forthcoming. 'Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism', in Brüntrop & Papineau, D. 1998. 'Mind the gap,' Philosophical Perspectives 12: S12, 373-89.

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    Because micropsychism is reliant on a deflationary account of facts concerning human and animal experience, it is a much less plausible view than cosmopsychism.

    “In summary, I believe that micropsychism is, whilst cosmopsychism is not, reliant on a deflationary account of facts concerning human and animal experience, and that because of this the former is a much less plausible view than the latter.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § Appendix: Demystifying Metaphysical Elitism

    Schaffer has persuasively argued that Sider fails to make the notion of metaphysical privilege earn its keep by demonstrating its theoretical utility.

    “However, Schaffer has persuasively argued that Sider fails to do this.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Schaffer 2010: 47 source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Appendix: Demystifying Metaphysical Elitism

    We have a primitive notion of 'basic existence': the kind of existence at play when we ask whether God or Platonic entities exist, the kind of existence we predicate of the fundamental entities in our metaphysical system.

    “I start from the idea that we have a primitive notion of 'basic existence': the kind of existence at play when we ask whether God or Platonic entities exist, the kind of existence we predicate of the fundamental entities in our metaphysical system.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Appendix: Demystifying Metaphysical Elitism

    The most general simple concept, without which any understanding of reality would be impossible, is the simple notion of existence itself.

    “The most general such simple concept, without which any understanding of reality would be impossible, is the simple notion of existence itself.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Appendix: Demystifying Metaphysical Elitism

    The sentence 'There is a party at John's' does not assert the basic existence of a party; it states that certain people are revelling.

    “Rather we use that sentence to state that certain people are revelling.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Appendix: Demystifying Metaphysical Elitism

    This simple notion of existence cannot be defined in more fundamental terms.

    “This simple notion of existence cannot be defined in more fundamental terms: we can say that for something to exist in this sense is for it to be 'real' or to be 'part of the world', but these are just different ways of saying the same thing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given
    § Appendix: Demystifying Metaphysical Elitism

    We cannot avoid a foundationalist picture of our conceptual scheme.

    “For these reasons I cannot see how we can avoid a foundationalist picture of our conceptual scheme.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Appendix: Demystifying Metaphysical Elitism

    In so far as we have positive understanding of reality, that understanding must be built up out of simple concepts.

    “However, in so far as we have positive understanding of reality, that understanding must be built up out of simple concepts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § Appendix: Demystifying Metaphysical Elitism

    One use of the verb to be and related expressions in natural language is to express basic existence.

    “One use of the verb to be and related expressions in natural language is to express basic existence.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    Micropsychism is, whilst cosmopsychism is not, reliant on a deflationary account of facts concerning human and animal experience.

    “In summary, I believe that micropsychism is, whilst cosmopsychism is not, reliant on a deflationary account of facts concerning human and animal experience, and that because of this the former is a much less plausible view than the latter.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Micropsychism and Cosmopsychism

    Facts about o-consciousness are subsumed within the fundamental facts about the conscious universe, and this accounts for the fact that facts about o-consciousness are nothing over and above the fundamental facts about the conscious universe.

    “The cosmopsychist need not suppose this: facts about oconsciousness are subsumed within the fundamental facts about the conscious universe, and this accounts for the fact that facts about o-consciousness are nothing over and above the fundamental facts about the conscious universe.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § Appendix: Demystifying Metaphysical Elitism

    Existence language is used in a much broader way than to express basic existence.

    “However, existence language is used in a much broader way.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
38 of 38

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The physical facts about my body and brain can wholly account for my conscious experience only if those physical facts necessitate the facts about my conscious experience.

    “The physical facts about my body and brain can wholly account for my conscious experience only if those physical facts necessitate the facts about my conscious experience.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A world with a functioning body and brain physically identical to my own but with no consciousness is conceivable, in the sense of being rationally coherent.

    “And yet there is good reason to think that such a world is conceivable, in the sense of being rationally coherent”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Conceivability of a world (rational coherence) gives good reason to think that world is possible.

    “and this gives us good reason to think that such a world is possible.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Grounding must be one or other of the two forms outlined (truthmaking or subsumption).

    “Thus, I will tentatively suppose in what follows that grounding must be one or other of the two forms I have outlined above.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Causal powers are grounded in categorical properties.

    “I am assuming that causal powers are grounded in categorical properties.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The metaphysical truth-conditions of propositions concerning o-consciousness are a priori accessible.

    “1.The metaphysical truth-conditions of propositions concerning o-consciousness are a priori accessible.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    It is not plausible that there are a priori accessible metaphysical truth-conditions of propositions about o-consciousness that concern micro-level conscious entities.

    “3. It is not plausible that there are a priori accessible metaphysical truth-conditions of propositions about o-consciousness that concern micro-level conscious entities.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Conscious subjects have causal powers.

    “Conscious subjects have causal powers, and yet the categorical nature of a conscious state does not seem to essentially involve causal power, as evidenced by the fact that epiphenomenalism is coherent.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    If conscious subjects are material, then they are spatially extended.

    “If conscious subjects are material, then they are spatially extended.”
9 of 9

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • The stated grounding paradox reverses the identity condition

    Minor

    The first passage says the difficulty arises when X and Y are identical. Later, the paper identifies the difficulty as explaining how X can be nothing more than Y when they are not identical.

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Related

Authors
Goff, P.
Corresponding author
Goff, Philip
ORCID
Goff, Philip
Venue
The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2019-12-10
Pages
144-156
DOI
10.4324/9781315717708-13
OpenAlex
W3003645352
Cited by
42
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1
FWCI
23.59
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Keywords
cosmopsychism, metaphysics of consciousness

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