Thinking in language? Evolution and a modularist possibility
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Abstract
Introduction: the modular mind This chapter will attempt to develop a modularist version of (a relatively weak form of) the cognitive conception of language (weak, because it only claims it to be naturally necessary that some of our thoughts should constitutively involve natural language – see chapter 1, where we point out that one obstacle to taking the cognitive conception of language seriously, amongst cognitive scientists, is an unnecessary focus on conceptual and/or universal versions of it). In my 1996a I argued at length in support of the cognitive conception of language, and responded to a variety of objections to it. I also regarded it as important to claim that the cognitive conception could be consistent with a more or less modular conception of language and mind; but the idea was not really spelled out, and the consistency not demonstrated. The purpose of this chapter is to remedy that deficiency. I should stress, however, that the main point of the chapter is to defend a possibility – I want to show how it is possible for modularism and the cognitive conception of language both to be true together, so that others may begin to investigate the possibilities. I make no attempt to present anything resembling a defence of a worked-out model of cognition. But first I need to give some background. According to Jerry Fodor's (1983) account, the human mind is cleanly divided into two distinct aspects or parts – into a set of peripheral input (and output) modules, on the one hand, and central cognition on the other.
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Citations
Cited by
The cognitive functions of language
Carruthers, P. (2002) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x02000122 · Cited by 728
Self-citationThe cognitive basis of model-based reasoning in science
Nersessian, N. J. (2002) · The Cognitive Basis of Science · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.008 · Cited by 313
Inner Monologue: Embodied Reasoning through Planning with Language Models
Huang, W., Xia, F., Xiao, T., Chan, H., Liang, J., Florence, P., Zeng, A., Tompson, J., Mordatch, I., Chebotar, Y., et al. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2207.05608 · Cited by 287
“This raises an intriguing possibility: beyond their ability to interpret natural language instructions, can language models further serve as reasoning models that combine multiple sources of feedback and become interactive problem solvers for embodied tasks, such as robotic manipulation? Prior studies show that langua…”
The Cognitive Basis of Science
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517 · Cited by 276
Inner speech and bilingual autobiographical memory: a Polish–Danish cross-cultural study
Larsen, S. F., Schrauf, R. W., Fromholt, P., & Rubin, D. C. (2002) · Memory · doi:10.1080/09658210143000218 · Cited by 129
“Some philosophers in fact suggest that thought is inextricably linked to language (e.g. Cavell, 1993; Wittgenstein, 1953) or that at least all conscious thought takes place in natural language (Carruthers, 1996, 1998).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Carruthers, P.
- Venue
- Language and Thought
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1998-08-06
- Pages
- 94-120
- OpenAlex
- W1913341351
- Cited by
- 66
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 8.13
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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