CoChat

The meta-intentional nature of executive functions and theory of mind

Perner, Josef · 1998 · Language and Thought
Cited by 106

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Abstract

Introduction There is a strong intuition that what we express linguistically we are (on the whole) conscious of, and Dennett (1978) has seen the essence of conscious thought in the availability of its contents to verbal report. On intuitive grounds a similarly close relationship exists between consciousness and voluntary control. In fact, Jacoby's (1991) famous ‘process dissociation procedure’ for determining the relative contributions of implicit/unconscious and explicit/conscious information to performance in memory or subliminal perception tasks (Debner and Jacoby, 1994) presupposes that conscious information consists of those contents of memory over which one can exert voluntary control. And naturally, voluntary control in these experiments consists in the ability to implement the verbal instructions, to either include or exclude specified events of the past in one's test answers. I now want to analyse the representational pre-requisites for controlled action at some length in order to show that it requires a meta-intentional representation of one's own intentions. This requirement then provides the basis for explaining its kinship with language and conscious thought. The close link between conscious processing of verbal information and (executive) control is also emphasised in the more standard model of working memory. I chose the term Executive Function (e.g., Ozonoff et al . 1991) as a generic term for those functions that are allegedly served by, e.g., the Central Executive within working memory (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974) or the Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) of Norman and Shallice (1980/1986), which all bear a close family resemblance to each other (Shallice and Burgess, 1993, p. 173).

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9780511597909.017

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 106

Metadata

Authors
Perner, J.
Venue
Language and Thought
Published
1998-08-06
Pages
270-283
OpenAlex
W2506886484
Cited by
106
References
0
FWCI
28.45
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The meta-intentional nature of executive functions and theory of mind. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511597909.017
The paper
Perner, J. (1998). The meta-intentional nature of executive functions and theory of mind. Language and Thought. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511597909.017

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.