Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 211 of the 214 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states

Apperly, Ian A., Butterfill, Stephen A. · 2009 · Psychological Review

Abstract

The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans' capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years of age (H. Wellman, D. Cross, & J. Watson, 2001; H. Wimmer & J. Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false-belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (K. H. Onishi & R. Baillargeon, 2005; L. Surian, S. Caldi, & D. Sperber, 2007). Nonhuman animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behavior (e.g., J. Call & M. Tomasello, 2005). Fluent social interaction in adult humans implies efficient processing of beliefs, yet direct tests suggest that belief reasoning is cognitively demanding, even for adults (e.g., I. A. Apperly, D. Samson, & G. W. Humphreys, 2009). The authors interpret these findings by drawing an analogy with the domain of number cognition, where similarly contrasting results have been observed. They propose that the success of infants and nonhuman animals on some belief reasoning tasks may be best explained by a cognitively efficient but inflexible capacity for tracking belief-like states. In humans, this capacity persists in parallel with a later-developing, more flexible but more cognitively demanding theory-of-mind abilities.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/a0016923

Cites

211 of 211 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 214 references

Cited by

See all 1,261

Metadata

Authors
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A.
Affiliations
  • University of Birmingham (GB)
  • University of Warwick (GB)
Venue
Psychological Review
Published
2009
Volume
116
Issue
4
Pages
953-970
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
OpenAlex
W2100694823
Cited by
1,261
References
214
Citations by year
2026: 58 · 2025: 82 · 2024: 126 · 2023: 102 · 2022: 93 · 2021: 93 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 84 · 2017: 83 · 2016: 77 · 2015: 75 · 2014: 61 · 2013: 66 · 2012: 36
FWCI
54.20
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
belief reasoning, theory of mind, false belief tasks, cognitive development, numerical cognition, cognitive flexibility, cognitive efficiency, infants, non-human animals, social cognition
MeSH terms
Adult, Animals, Child, Child, Preschool, Culture, Defense Mechanisms, Humans, Infant, Judgment, Problem Solving, Self Concept, Social Behavior, Socialization, Personal Construct Theory

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/a0016923
The paper
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states. Psychological Review. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016923

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.