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Simulation and self-knowledge: a defence of theory-theory
Abstract
In this chapter I shall be attempting to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I shall argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or of our knowledge of, minded agency. Theory-theory Let me begin by pinning my colours to the mast: I am a theory-theorist. I believe that our understanding of mentalistic notions – of belief, desire, perception, intention, and the rest – is largely given by the positions those notions occupy within a folk-psychological theory of the structure and functioning of the mind. To understand one of these notions is to know – at least implicitly – sufficiently much of the corpus of folk-psychology, and to know the role within that theory of the notion in question. I also maintain that children's developing competence with these mentalistic notions involves them in moving through a series of progressively more sophisticated theories – for example, moving from desire-perception theory, through a copy-theory of belief, to full-blown, intentionalistic, belief-desire theory (see Wellman, 1990).
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Cited by
Mind reading: Neural mechanisms of theory of mind and self-perspective
Vogeley, K., Bussfeld, P., Newen, A., Herrmann, S., Happé, F., Falkai, P., Maier, W., Shah, N. J., Fink, G. R., & Zilles, K. (2001) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.0789 · Cited by 998
How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition
Carruthers, P. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000545 · Cited by 610
Self-citationSocial Cognitive Neuroscience of Empathy: Concepts, Circuits, and Genes
Walter, H. (2012) · Emotion Review · doi:10.1177/1754073911421379 · Cited by 388
Gallagher, S. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198846345.001.0001 · Cited by 359
God's Beliefs versus Mother's: The Development of Nonhuman Agent Concepts
Barrett, J. L., Richert, R. A., & Driesenga, A. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00265 · Cited by 317
Metadata
- Authors
- Carruthers, P.
- Venue
- Theories of Theories of Mind
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1996-02-23
- Pages
- 22-38
- OpenAlex
- W2160411037
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.99
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Carruthers, P. (1996). Simulation and self-knowledge: a defence of theory-theory. Theories of Theories of Mind. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511597985.004
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