Cited by 610Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceChild and Animal Learning DevelopmentEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition

Carruthers, Peter·2009·Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Abstract

Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 of this target article introduces the four accounts. Section 2 develops the "mindreading is prior" model in more detail, showing how it predicts introspection for perceptual and quasi-perceptual (e.g., imagistic) mental events while claiming that metacognitive access to our own attitudes always results from swift unconscious self-interpretation. This section also considers the model's relationship to the expression of attitudes in speech. Section 3 argues that the commonsense belief in the existence of introspection should be given no weight. Section 4 argues briefly that data from childhood development are of no help in resolving this debate. Section 5 considers the evolutionary claims to which the different accounts are committed, and argues that the three introspective views make predictions that are not borne out by the data. Section 6 examines the extensive evidence that people often confabulate when self-attributing attitudes. Section 7 considers "two systems" accounts of human thinking and reasoning, arguing that although there are introspectable events within System 2, there are no introspectable attitu…

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Crossref · 10.1017/s0140525x09000545

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  • Model-based contributions to metacognition rely on extensions of the models that guide our predictions of the mental states and behaviors of other people (theory of mind or mentalizing).

    “A long-standing proposal is that model-based contributions to metacognition rely on extensions of the models that guide our predictions of the mental states and behaviors of other people-a capacity known as theory of mind or mentalizing (Carruthers 2009).”

    From Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis (2024) · cites this paper as Carruthers 2009

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Authors
Carruthers, P.
Affiliations
University of Maryland, College Park (US)
Corresponding author
Carruthers, Peter
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Published
2009-04
Volume
32
Issue
2
Pages
121-138
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
OpenAlex
W2138336342
Cited by
610
References
39
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 57 · 2022: 49 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 48 · 2019: 62 · 2018: 34 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 42 · 2014: 30 · 2013: 38 · 2012: 43
FWCI
49.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
theory of mind, metacognition, self-reflection, propositional attitudes, self-knowledge, confabulation, two-system model, schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorder, child development
MeSH terms
Adult, Attitude, Autistic Disorder, Child Behavior, Child, Preschool, Cognition, Consciousness, Biological Evolution, Humans, Models, Psychological, Schizophrenic Psychology, Self-Assessment, Thinking, Intuition

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