The DOI matches its Crossref record; 43 of the 43 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Economics of Multidimensional Screening
Abstract
MOTIVATION AND INTRODUCTION Since the late 1970s, the theory of optimal screening contracts has received considerable attention. The analysis has been usefully applied to such topics as optimal taxation, public good provision, nonlinear pricing, imperfect competition in differentiated industries, regulation with information asymmetries, government procurement, and auctions, to name a few prominent examples. The majority of these applications have made the assumption that preferences can be ordered by a single dimension of private information, largely to facilitate finding the optimal solution of the design problem. However, in most cases that we can think of, a multidimensional preference parameterization seems critical to capturing the basic economics of the environment. For example, consider the case of duopolists in a market where each firm competes with nonlinear pricing over its product line. In many examples of nonlinear pricing (e.g., Mussa and Rosen 1978 and Maskin and Riley 1984), it is natural to think of consumers' preferences being ordered by the willingness to pay for additional units of quantity or quality. But, if we believe that competition between duopolists is imperfect in the horizontal dimension as suggested, for example, by models such as Hotelling's (1929), then we need to introduce a form of horizontal heterogeneity as well. As a consequence, a minimally accurate model of imperfect competition between duopolists suggests including two dimensions of heterogeneity – vertical and horizontal. There are several additional economic applications that naturally lend themselves to multidimensional heterogeneity.
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Cites
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Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
de Vries, S., & Vohra, R. V. (2003) · INFORMS Journal on Computing · doi:10.1287/ijoc.15.3.284.16077 · Cited by 985
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Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5 · Cited by 420
Metadata
- Authors
- Rochet, J.-C., & Stole, L. A.
- Venue
- Advances in Economics and Econometrics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2010-01-12
- Pages
- 150-197
- OpenAlex
- W1537544780
- Cited by
- 289
- References
- 43
- FWCI
- 75.56
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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