The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Replication and Functionalism
Abstract
TWO STRATEGIES In this essay I want to examine two contrasted models of what we do when we try to get insight into other people's thoughts and behaviour by citing their beliefs, desires, fears, hopes, and so forth. On one model we are using what I shall call the functional strategy, and on the other what I label the replicative strategy. I shall argue that the view that we use the replicative strategy is much more plausible than the view that we use the functionalist strategy. But the two strategies issue in different styles of explanation and call upon different ranges of concepts. So at the end of the essay I shall make some brief remarks about these contrasts. The core of the functionalist strategy is the assumption that explanation of action or mental state through mention of beliefs, desires, emotions, and so on is causal. The approach is resolutely third-personal. The Cartesian introspectionist error – the idea that from some direct confrontation with psychological items in our own case we learn their nature – is repudiated. We are said to view other people as we view stars, clouds or geological formations. People are just complex objects in our environment whose behaviour we wish to anticipate but whose causal innards we cannot perceive. We therefore proceed by observing the intricacies of their external behaviour and formulating some hypotheses about how the insides are structured. The hypotheses are typically of this form: ‘The innards are like this.
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Cites
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Psychophysical and theoretical identifications
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(2010) · Mind, Language and Reality · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625251.023 · Cited by 171
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Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.114.4.864 · Cited by 4,069
Dissociable Medial Prefrontal Contributions to Judgments of Similar and Dissimilar Others
Mitchell, J. P., Macrae, C. N., & Banaji, M. R. (2006) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.040 · Cited by 1,023
Episodic Simulation of Future Events: Concepts, Data, and Applications
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2008) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1196/annals.1440.001 · Cited by 840
The Link between Social Cognition and Self-referential Thought in the Medial Prefrontal Cortex
Mitchell, J. P., Banaji, M. R., & Macrae, C. N. (2005) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/0898929055002418 · Cited by 806
The cognitive functions of language
Carruthers, P. (2002) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x02000122 · Cited by 728
Metadata
- Venue
- Mind, Reason and Imagination
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2003-03-31
- Pages
- 11-27
- OpenAlex
- W102140828
- Cited by
- 187
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 27.20
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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