Naming and Necessity
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Zombie-Jackson has intentional states.
“Contrary to Searle, a good case can be made that zombie-Jackson does have intentional states.”
From Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem (1999) · cites this paper as Kripke 1972
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 5,457 · see citing works
A survey of named entity recognition and classification
Nadeau, D., & Sekine, S. (2007) · Lingvisticae Investigationes · doi:10.1075/li.30.1.03nad · Cited by 2,507 · see citing works
Barrett, L. F. (2006) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2006.00003.x · Cited by 1,859 · see citing works
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574 · see citing works
Bering, J. M. (2006) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x06009101 · Cited by 458 · see citing works
Silverstein, M. (2005) · Journal of Linguistic Anthropology · doi:10.1525/jlin.2005.15.1.6 · Cited by 438 · see citing works
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367 · see citing works
Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
Balog, K. (1999) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2998286 · Cited by 242 · see citing works
Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., & Herzog, M. H. (2021) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214 · Cited by 194 · see citing works
“More precisely, although the software and hardware used in that implementation are sufficient to instantiate Microsoft 2Multiple realization has been a fruitful topic in philosophy (Fodor, 1974; Kripke, 1972; Putnam, 1967, 1988).”
BackgroundMethodIntrospective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness
Jack, A. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00128-1 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology
Goldman, A. I. (1993) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.2307/1522948 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Fine-Tuning and Multiple Universes
White, R. (2000) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00210 · Cited by 154 · see citing works
What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths?
Lowe, E. J. (2012) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzs122 · Cited by 150 · see citing works
Your Understanding Is My Understanding: Evidence for a Community of Knowledge
Sloman, S. A., & Rabb, N. (2016) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797616662271 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument
Pruss, A. R. (2009) · The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology · doi:10.1002/9781444308334.ch2 · Cited by 70 · see citing works
The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem
Goff, P. (2016) · Panpsychism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0012 · Cited by 49 · see citing works
Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief
Whiting, D. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01905-z · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Scientific explanation: A critical survey
Schurz, G. (1995) · Foundations of Science · doi:10.1007/bf00145406 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Collapsing the modal collapse argument: On an invalid argument against divine simplicity
Tomaszewski, C. (2019) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/any052 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
The influence of prior belief on scientific thinking
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2002) · The Cognitive Basis of Science · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.011 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Designators, descriptions, and artifact persistence
Marchak, K. A., & Hall, D. G. (2019) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2019.06.011 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Mander, W. J. (2018) · Sophia · doi:10.1007/s11841-017-0585-x · Cited by 3 · see citing works
مازاریان, ع. (2019) · DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) · doi:10.22091/jptr-pfk.2019.3925.2023 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
- Authors
- Kripke, S. A.
- Affiliations
- Rockefeller University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kripke, Saul A.
- ORCID
- Kripke, Saul A.
- Venue
- Semantics of Natural Language
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Published
- 1972
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 217
- Pages
- 253-355
- OpenAlex
- W1516748551
- Cited by
- 7,028
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 54 · 2025: 71 · 2024: 121 · 2023: 113 · 2022: 68 · 2021: 198 · 2020: 295 · 2019: 370 · 2018: 277 · 2017: 277 · 2016: 262 · 2015: 273 · 2014: 295 · 2013: 285 · 2012: 257
- FWCI
- 52.75
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Springer eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Philosophy
- Critica
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Keywords
- naming, necessity, reference, mind-body problem, identity thesis, materialism, contingency, substance, natural kinds
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
