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Laws of Nature
Abstract
John Carroll undertakes a careful philosophical examination of laws of nature, causation, and other related topics. He argues that laws of nature are not susceptible to the sort of philosophical treatment preferred by empiricists. Indeed he shows that emperically pure matters of fact need not even determine what the laws are. Similar, even stronger, conclusions are drawn about causation. Replacing the traditional view of laws and causation requiring some kind of foundational legitimacy, the author argues that these phenomena are inextricably intertwined with everything else. This distinctively clear and detailed discussion of what it is to be a law will be valuable to a broad swathe of philosophers in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science.
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“But this appears to be false; there appear to be worlds that match in their mosaics but differ in their laws.”
From Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature (2020) · cites this paper as Carroll (1994, pp. 57-67)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Carroll, J. W.
- Corresponding author
- Carroll, John W.
- ORCID
- Carroll, John W.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1994-02-25
- OpenAlex
- W4245724896
- Cited by
- 314
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 49 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 4.95
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- laws of nature, causality, empiricism, matters of fact, foundationalism, metaphysics of law, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science
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