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Who knows what and who can we believe? Epistemological beliefs are beliefs about knowledge (mostly) to be attained from others
Abstract
Introduction In this chapter we will discuss some implications of the distributed nature of knowledge for the study and for the teaching of epistemological beliefs. We will elaborate on the following argument: due to the division of labor in modern societies, knowledge is distributed and used unevenly. Most knowledge claims are based on specialized knowledge provided by specialized experts, and the knowledge is organized into disciplines, reflecting such specialization. In the following chapter, the uneven distribution and use of knowledge is called “division of cognitive labor.” Because much of our knowledge is acquired from others, most everyday epistemological issues regard the assessment of knowledge claims made by others who are experts for issues we are not experts for. Improving epistemological judgments, therefore, requires the improvement of a person's capacity to understand how specialized knowledge is distributed (who knows what) and to evaluate expert sources (whom to believe). In the first part of this chapter the notion of the “division of cognitive labor” is explained. Secondly, how the uneven distribution of cognitive labor and the dependency from experts has been conceived in research on epistemological beliefs will be discussed. The well-known dimensions “source” and “justification of knowledge” will take the section's center stage. The dimension “source” describes knowledge which is not constructed by the knower and implies a rather negative view on experts’ knowledge. The dimension “justification of knowledge” refers to beliefs necessary for the assessment of experts’ knowledge claims, but the “sophisticated” subject is mostly conceived of as overcoming the division of cognitive labor.
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“This is because nonexperts are most likely not able to directly evaluate the knowledge claims that are put forward in scientific publications (see also Bromme et al., 2010 and the notion of firsthand and secondhand evaluations).”
From A Randomized Controlled Study on the Effectiveness of Plain Language Summaries of Psychological Meta-Analyses (2025) · cites this paper as Bromme et al., 2010
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Sinatra, G. M., Kienhues, D., & Hofer, B. K. (2014) · Educational Psychologist · doi:10.1080/00461520.2014.916216 · Cited by 422
Self-citationHendriks, F., Kienhues, D., & Bromme, R. (2015) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0139309 · Cited by 373
Self-citationThe Public's Bounded Understanding of Science
Bromme, R., & Goldman, S. R. (2014) · Educational Psychologist · doi:10.1080/00461520.2014.921572 · Cited by 282
Self-citationTrust in Science and the Science of Trust
Hendriks, F., Kienhues, D., & Bromme, R. (2016) · Progress in IS · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-28059-2_8 · Cited by 248
Self-citationOn the Goals of Epistemic Education: Promoting Apt Epistemic Performance
Barzilai, S., & Chinn, C. A. (2017) · Journal of the Learning Sciences · doi:10.1080/10508406.2017.1392968 · Cited by 265
Metadata
- Authors
- Bromme, R., Kienhues, D., & Porsch, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Münster (DE)
- Venue
- Personal Epistemology in the Classroom
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2010-01-28
- Pages
- 163-194
- OpenAlex
- W369650640
- Cited by
- 146
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 22.41
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Educational Strategies and Epistemologies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Education › Science Education and Pedagogy
- Keywords
- epistemological beliefs, distributed knowledge, division of cognitive labor, epistemic trust, expert knowledge, epistemic sources, justification of knowledge
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