The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes
Abstract
Introduction This paper is primarily devoted to a study of the (static) optimality properties (e.g., Pareto-optimality of the equilibria) of certain resource allocation mechanisms. It is shown that one such mechanism (the “greed process”) is optimal in a class of economic environments much broader than the class for which perfect competition is optimal. More specifically, the greed process has the desired optimality properties for all environments from which so-called external economies or diseconomies are absent; unlike perfect competition, the greed process does not presuppose the absence of indivisible goods, of discontinuities, or of increasing returns. However, the greed process lacks the dynamic (stability) properties known to hold for perfect competition, at least in certain special cases. That the greed process does have certain optimality properties would be of little interest, were it not for the fact that it belongs to a class of informationally decentralized processes and hence shares with perfect competition a feature that has been extolled as one of the main virtues of the classical market mechanism. Still, just because it is designed to cover a broader class of environments, the greed process calls for more information (is informationally less efficient) than the competitive mechanism. To illustrate this, a variant of the latter (called “quasi-competitive”) is constructed and is shown to have the desired optimality properties when the environment satisfies the usual divisibility and convexity assumptions, while requiring less information than does the greed process.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
(1970) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1970.tb01072.x · Cited by 1,506
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555015 · Cited by 1,469
Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136363 · Cited by 1,455
Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science
(1991) · Papers in Experimental Economics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.018 · Cited by 1,418
Metadata
- Authors
- Hurwicz, L.
- Venue
- Studies in Resource Allocation Processes
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1977-11-30
- Pages
- 393-460
- OpenAlex
- W2990108307
- Cited by
- 410
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 117.65
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511752940.014
- The paper
- Hurwicz, L. (1977). Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes. Studies in Resource Allocation Processes. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511752940.014
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.