The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)
Abstract
We give an introduction to the micro-economic field of Mechanism Design slightly biased toward a computer-scientist's point of view. Introduction Mechanism Design is a subfield of economic theory that is rather unique within economics in having an engineering perspective. It is interested in designing economic mechanisms, just like computer scientists are interested in designing algorithms, protocols, or systems. It is best to view the goals of the designed mechanisms in the very abstract terms of social choice . A social choice is simply an aggregation of the preferences of the different participants toward a single joint decision. Mechanism Design attempts implementing desired social choices in a strategic setting – assuming that the different members of society each act rationally in a game theoretic sense. Such strategic design is necessary since usually the preferences of the participants are private. This high-level abstraction of aggregation of preferences may be seen as a common generalization of a multitude of scenarios in economics as well as in other social settings such as political science. Here are some basic classic examples: Elections : In political elections each voter has his own preferences between the different candidates, and the outcome of the elections is a single social choice. Markets : Classical economic theory usually assumes the existence and functioning of a “perfect market.” In reality, of course, we have only interactions between people, governed by some protocols. Each participant in such an interaction has his own preferences, but the outcome is a single social choice: the reallocation of goods and money. […]
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Game theory meets network security and privacy
Manshaei, M. H., Zhu, Q., Alpcan, T., Bacşar, T., & Hubaux, J.-P. (2013) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2480741.2480742 · Cited by 808
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., & Wooldridge, M. (2012) · Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-01558-8 · Cited by 337
Approximate mechanism design without money
Procaccia, A. D., & Tennenholtz, M. (2009) · Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce · doi:10.1145/1566374.1566401 · Cited by 307
A Promising Path Towards Autoformalization and General Artificial Intelligence
Szegedy, C. (2020) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-53518-6_1 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Nisan, N.
- Venue
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2007-09-24
- Pages
- 209-242
- OpenAlex
- W2137906183
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 80.94
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists). https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511800481.011
- The paper
- Nisan, N. (2007). Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists). Algorithmic Game Theory. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511800481.011
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.