The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Choices, Values, and Frames
Abstract
This book presents the definitive exposition of 'prospect theory', a compelling alternative to the classical utility theory of choice. Building on the 1982 volume, Judgement Under Uncertainty, this book brings together seminal papers on prospect theory from economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, including the work of the late Amos Tversky, whose contributions are collected here for the first time. While remaining within a rational choice framework, prospect theory delivers more accurate, empirically verified predictions in key test cases, as well as helping to explain many complex, real-world puzzles. In this volume, it is brought to bear on phenomena as diverse as the principles of legal compensation, the equity premium puzzle in financial markets, and the number of hours that New York cab drivers choose to drive on rainy days. Theoretically elegant and empirically robust, this volume shows how prospect theory has matured into a new science of decision making.
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“This interferes with efforts to order them systematically, a constraint that also applies to people's desires or ethical beliefs, given that they too display inconsistency and variation depending upon how a choice is described (Kahneman and Tversky 2000, 168-69).”
From Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020) · cites this paper as Kahneman and Tversky 2000
In the citing paper
“This interferes with efforts to order them systematically, a constraint that also applies to people's desires or ethical beliefs, given that they too display inconsistency and variation depending upon how a choice is described (Kahneman and Tversky 2000, 168-69).”
From Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020) · cites this paper as Kahneman and Tversky 2000
Citations
Cites
Kopit, A. L. (1984) · Cited by 18
Cited by
The weirdest people in the world?
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0999152x · Cited by 12,641
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction Method
Kahneman, D., Krueger, A. B., Schkade, D. A., Schwarz, N., & Stone, A. A. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1103572 · Cited by 3,422
Metadata
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2000-09-25
- OpenAlex
- W2477572219
- Semantic Scholar
- 6a733a032128700dac500f1298fbc71bade27769
- Cited by
- 2,987
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 41 · 2025: 63 · 2024: 141 · 2023: 130 · 2022: 106 · 2021: 142 · 2020: 196 · 2019: 179 · 2018: 121 · 2017: 109 · 2016: 114 · 2015: 117 · 2014: 142 · 2013: 129 · 2012: 121
- FWCI
- 14.39
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
- Keywords
- prospect theory, utility theory, decision making under risk, Amos Tversky, framing effects, risk aversion, equity premium puzzle, legal compensation, rational choice, psychology of decision making
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Choices, Values, and Frames. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511803475
- The paper
- Choices, Values, and Frames. (2000). Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511803475
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.