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Cited by 3,476Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsStatistics Education and MethodologiesClinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills

Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.

Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane·2002·Heuristics and Biases
DOI 10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004
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Abstract

The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a survey of 84 participants at the 1969 meetings of the Mathematical Psychology Society and the American Psychological Association (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). The respondents, including several authors of statistics texts, were asked realistic questions about the robustness of statistical estimates and the replicability of research results. The article commented tongue-in-heek on the prevalence of a belief that the law of large numbers applies to small numbers as well: Respondents placed too much confidence in the results of small samples, and their statistical judgments showed little sensitivity to sample size. The mathematical psychologists who participated in the survey not only should have known better – they did know better. Although their intuitive guesses were off the mark, most of them could have computed the correct answers on the back of an envelope. These sophisticated individuals apparently had access to two distinct approaches for answering statistical questions: one that is spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, and fast; and another that is deliberate, rule-governed, effortful, and slow. The persistence of large biases in the guesses of experts raised doubts about the educability of statistical intuitions. Moreover, it was known that the same biases affect choices in the real world, where researchers commonly select sample sizes that are too small to provide a fair test of their hyp…

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  • Cognitive load increases the reliance on shortcuts and heuristics in making choices.

    “Cognitive load increases the reliance on shortcuts and heuristics in making choices (Kahneman 2011; Kahneman and Frederick 2002).”

    From Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory (2022) · cites this paper as Kahneman and Frederick 2002

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Authors
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S.
Affiliations
  • Princeton University (US)
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
ORCID
Frederick, Shane
Venue
Heuristics and Biases
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Published
2002-07-08
Pages
49-81
DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004
OpenAlex
W1843246605
Cited by
3,476
References
111
Citations by year
2026: 126 · 2025: 167 · 2024: 185 · 2023: 248 · 2022: 199 · 2021: 220 · 2020: 242 · 2019: 200 · 2018: 173 · 2017: 171 · 2016: 169 · 2015: 186 · 2014: 190 · 2013: 151 · 2012: 144
FWCI
28.41
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 3620 d)
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Statistics Education and Methodologies
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
Keywords
representativeness heuristic, attribute substitution, intuitive judgment, heuristics and biases, law of large numbers, representativeness bias

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