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New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption
Abstract
This book presents the definitive exposition of 'prospect theory', a compelling alternative to the classical utility theory of choice. Building on the 1982 volume, Judgement Under Uncertainty, this book brings together seminal papers on prospect theory from economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, including the work of the late Amos Tversky, whose contributions are collected here for the first time. While remaining within a rational choice framework, prospect theory delivers more accurate, empirically verified predictions in key test cases, as well as helping to explain many complex, real-world puzzles. In this volume, it is brought to bear on phenomena as diverse as the principles of legal compensation, the equity premium puzzle in financial markets, and the number of hours that New York cab drivers choose to drive on rainy days. Theoretically elegant and empirically robust, this volume shows how prospect theory has matured into a new science of decision making.
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Citations
Cited by
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
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Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2004) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00433.x · Cited by 3,885
Beyond money: toward an economy of well-being
Diener, E., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00501001.x · Cited by 2,555
The psychology and neurobiology of addiction: an incentive–sensitization view
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2000) · Addiction · doi:10.1046/j.1360-0443.95.8s2.19.x · Cited by 1,507
The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour
Kirchler, E., & Braithwaite, V. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511628238 · Cited by 1,206
Metadata
- Authors
- Kahneman, D.
- Venue
- Choices, Values, and Frames
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2000-09-25
- Pages
- 758-774
- OpenAlex
- W2338238177
- Cited by
- 474
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.87
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
