The DOI matches its Crossref record; 153 of the 153 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Abstract
Is our case strong enough to go to trial? Will interest rates go up? Can I trust this person? Such questions - and the judgments required to answer them - are woven into the fabric of everyday experience. This book, first published in 2002, examines how people make such judgments. The study of human judgment was transformed in the 1970s, when Kahneman and Tversky introduced their 'heuristics and biases' approach and challenged the dominance of strictly rational models. Their work highlighted the reflexive mental operations used to make complex problems manageable and illuminated how the same processes can lead to both accurate and dangerously flawed judgments. The heuristics and biases framework generated a torrent of influential research in psychology - research that reverberated widely and affected scholarship in economics, law, medicine, management, and political science. This book compiles the most influential research in the heuristics and biases tradition since the initial collection of 1982 (by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky).
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Citations
Cites
The theory of planned behavior
Ajzen, I. (1991) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-t · Cited by 90,587
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change
Bandura, A. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.2.191 · Cited by 43,925
An inventory for measuring depression
BECK, A. T. (1961) · Archives of General Psychiatry · doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1961.01710120031004 · Cited by 38,032
The satisfaction with life scale
Diener, E., Emmons, R. A., Larsen, R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985) · Journal of Personality Assessment · doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa4901_13 · Cited by 31,768
Society and the Adolescent Self-Image
Rosenberg, M. (1965) · doi:10.1515/9781400876136 · Cited by 30,126
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Festinger, L. (1957) · doi:10.1515/9781503620766 · Cited by 24,241
The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation.
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.117.3.497 · Cited by 23,245
Grice, H. P. (1975) · Speech Acts · doi:10.1163/9789004368811_003 · Cited by 23,221
Cited by
The weirdest people in the world?
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0999152x · Cited by 12,641
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health, Education, and the Workplace
Dunning, D., Heath, C., & Suls, J. M. (2004) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1111/j.1529-1006.2004.00018.x · Cited by 1,865
Reyna, V. F., & Farley, F. (2006) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1111/j.1529-1006.2006.00026.x · Cited by 1,244
Metadata
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2002-07-08
- OpenAlex
- W2242842357
- Cited by
- 2,192
- References
- 153
- FWCI
- 14.02
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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