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Subjective Probability: The Real Thing

Jeffrey, Richard · 2004 · Cambridge University Press eBooks

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Abstract

This book offers a concise survey of basic probability theory from a thoroughly subjective point of view whereby probability is a mode of judgment. Written by one of the greatest figures in the field of probability theory, the book is both a summation and synthesis of a lifetime of wrestling with these problems and issues. After an introduction to basic probability theory, there are chapters on scientific hypothesis-testing, on changing your mind in response to generally uncertain observations, on expectations of the values of random variables, on de Finetti's dissolution of the so-called problem of induction, and on decision theory.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9780511816161

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Metadata

Authors
Jeffrey, R.
Affiliations
Princeton University (US)
Corresponding author
Jeffrey, Richard
Venue
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Published
2004-04-12
OpenAlex
W4231476092
Cited by
167
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 9
FWCI
0.97
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Literary, Cultural, Historical Analysis
Keywords
subjective probability, scientific hypothesis testing, uncertain observations, de Finetti, problem of induction, decision theory, Bayesian inference

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511816161
The paper
Jeffrey, R. (2004). Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511816161

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.