The Interface Theory of Perception

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

On these interpretations, an unobserved electron lacks position, and its state does not generally predict the exact position a measurement will find, so no causal story explains the precise result.

“According to these interpretations an electron, for instance, has no position when it is not observed and the state of the electron does not, in general, allow one to predict the specific position one will find when making a position measurement, i.e., no causal account can be given for the precise measurement obtained.”

• cites Allday 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Fuchs 2010 sourcePartly supported

  In “PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST” (pp. 6–7), Fuchs says measurement consequences are generally incompletely predictable and describes an outcome as something new that comes into the world. But the paper does not establish the categorical claim that an unobserved electron has no position: “THE ESSENCE OF BELL'S THEOREM, QBISM STYLE” (p. 15) presents a system's lack of a definite premeasurement value as one of two positions under discussion. Nor does unpredictability establish that no causal account of a precise result can be given. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

In the example, an interface strategy tuned to payoffs is a strict interface because its mapping from resource quantities to colors is not a homomorphism; it is an efficient channel for payoff information but poor for truth.

“It's a strict interface strategy, because the mapping from resource quantities to colors is not a homomorphism.For instance, some resource quantities that map to green are smaller than all resource quantities that map to blue (green bar on the left), but other resource quantities that map to green are greater than all resource quantities that map to blue (green bar on the right).”

• Also stated in: § Evolutionary games · plain

  “This strategy is an efficient communication channel for information about payoffs but a poor channel for truth.”

May combine two claims.

In the example with uniformly distributed resources and a Gaussian payoff, a critical realist can optimally estimate resource quantity from perceived color but cannot optimally estimate payoff; green and yellow are redundant for payoff.

“If the resources are uniformly distributed then this critical realist, given its perceived color, can optimally estimate the true quantity of resources.”

• Also stated in: § Evolutionary games · plain

  “However, it cannot optimally estimate the payoffs.If it sees green, then the payoff could range from nearly 100 to less than 25; if it sees yellow, it's exactly the same-green and yellow are redundant.”

May combine two claims.

The evolved perceptual strategy sees high-payoff squares as green and low-payoff squares as red, or vice versa, providing information required for effective foraging and being favored by the genetic algorithm.

“Instead, the robots wield a strategy that sees high payoff squares as green, and low payoff squares as red, or vice versa.This perceptual strategy provides the information required for effective foraging and is favored by the genetic algorithm.”

May combine two claims.

A perceptual channel can be good at communicating information about fitness while being bad at communicating information about truth, and vice versa.

“As we saw in the example in Fig. 5 above, it is possible to have a perceptual channel (a composition of a message construction kernel and a transfer kernel) that is good at communicating information about fitness but bad at communicating information about truth, and vice versa.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Even if you both see cube A at the same time, your cube A experiences are not numerically identical.

“Even if you both see cube A at the same time, your cube A experiences are not numerically identical.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

If you and a friend look at the Necker cube and she experiences cube A while you experience cube B, your cube experiences are not numerically identical.

“If you and a friend are both looking at Fig. 4, and she experiences cube A while you experience cube B, then clearly your cube experiences are not numerically identical.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

What is behind my screen that triggers it to display a Porsche is a complex tangle of code and transistors that does not resemble a Porsche.

“What is behind my screen that triggers it to display a Porsche is a complex tangle of code and transistors that does not resemble a Porsche.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

My chances of rendezvousing with you are better if I know the truth about where you are.

“Yes, my chances of rendezvousing with you are better if I know the truth about where you are, just as my chances of deleting a text file are better if I know the truth about where the icon of the text file is on my desktop interface.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

In Example 3, with X={x,x′}, G=Z2, S=N, and a.(x,s)=(x′,s+3), a.(x′,s)=(x,s), G acts transitively on X but its effect on W is not a group action because a.a.(x,s) does not equal e.(x,s).

“Let X = {x,x′} and S = ℕ, the natural numbers.Again, let the group be ℤ 2 .Leta.(x,s) = (x′,s+3) and a.(x′,s) = (x,s).Then a.a.(x,s) = (x,s+3)≠e.(x,s)= (x,s).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Example 2 provides a toy example where G has a bona-fide group action on X and g.s is in S_{g.x} whenever s is in S_x, yet there is no group action on W as a whole, so W is not a G-set.

“Here is a toy example of an agent's G acting on W in such a way that there is a bona-fide group action of G on X and we always have g.s∈S g.x whenever s∈S x , yet there is no group action on W as a whole: W is not a G-set.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

In an online video game, the Porsche on my screen is not numerically identical to the Porsche on your screen.

“But the Porsche on my screen is not numerically identical to the Porsche on your screen.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

In the example, A is not 1:1, but examples where A is 1:1 are easy to generate.

“In this example, A is not 1:1, but it is not at all hard to generate examples where Ais 1:1, as the next example shows.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

In Example 1, if all fibres S_x are the same set S, then W = X × S, and the defined action is a group action on W that is trivial on the fibers and not transitive on W, so W is not a G-set.

“Suppose that all fibres S x (see the proof of the Invention of Symmetry Theorem) are the same set, S say.Then W=X×S: the world is a Cartesian product.If X is a Gset, let the action of g∈G on (x,s) be given by g.(x,s) = (g.x,s).This is a group action on W, but it is trivial on the fibers and is certainly not transitive on the whole of W, which is thus not a G-set.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Your cube A experience is not numerically identical to your cube B experience.

“Your cube A experience is not numerically identical to your cube B experience.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Mathematical tools-including evolutionary game theory, evolutionary graph theory, and genetic algorithms-can be used to study evolution by natural selection.

“Evolution by natural selection can be studied using mathematical tools, such as evolutionary game theory, evolutionary graph theory, and genetic algorithms”

• cites Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Mitchell 1998 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Nowak 2006 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

One must model how likely different perceptions are and how those likelihoods depend on world states.

“But it always seems necessary to model the probabilities of various perceptions and how these probabilities vary with states of the world.”

May combine two claims.

Perceptual systems shaped by natural selection can be non-optimal in both structure and information, as long as they suffice for survival and reproduction.

“Thus, perceptual systems that evolve by natural selection need not be optimal in structure and need not deliver optimal information, just information sufficient for survival and reproduction.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Most perceptual scientists agree that natural selection has made human perception typically accurate and veridical, especially regarding aspects of reality important for survival.

“a broad consensus has emerged among perceptual scientists: Natural selection has shaped our perceptions to be, in the typical case, accurate depictions of reality, especially of those aspects of reality that are critical for our survival.”

• Also stated in: § Introduction · boosted

  “Yet there is consensus among perceptual scientists that natural selection has shaped the perceptions of H. sapiens to be, in the normal case, veridical.”

• cites Palmer 1999Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Marr (1982)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Trivers (2011)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Evolutionary games can model frequency-dependent selection, in which a strategy's fitness depends on how many individuals use it.

“Evolutionary games have the power to model frequencydependent selection, in which the fitness of strategies is not fixed, but instead varies with the proportion of individuals in the population that employ each strategy”

• cites Allen and Clarke 1984 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Nowak 2006 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

A definition of perceptual strategy must be broad enough to encompass all relevant strategies, so that evolutionary games and genetic algorithms do not miss viable ones.

“We need a definition of perceptual strategy that's broad enough to include all relevant strategies-otherwise our evolutionary games and genetic algorithms might inadvertently overlook viable strategies.”

May combine two claims.

Nonlinear payoff functions are common in biology, and organisms that maintain homeostasis are expected to have many nonmonotonic payoff functions.

“Such a nonlinear payoff function is quite common: Not enough water and one dies of thirst; too much and one drowns; somewhere in between is just right.Similarly for salt and a variety of other resources.Indeed, for organisms that must maintain homeostasis of a wide variety of variables, one can expect many nonmonotonic payoff functions.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

In the standard Bayesian framework, the space X plays two distinct roles: it is the set of objective world states and also the space of interpretations or hypotheses from which the visual system selects.

“Note, in particular, that in the standard Bayesian framework summarized above, space X plays two distinct roles.First, X corresponds to the set of objective world states.Second, X corresponds to the space of interpretations (or hypotheses) from among which the visual system must select.”

May combine two claims.

Fitness is a function of the objective world that depends on the organism, its state, and an action; there is no simple relation between fitness and truth.

“Fitness is a function of the objective world.However, a fitness function depends not just on the objective world but also on the organism, its state, and an action.”

• Also stated in: § Interface theory of perception · plain

  “There's no simple relation between fitness and truth, although many perceptual researchers assume otherwise.”

May combine two claims.

One cannot assume that properties of X correspond to properties of W; finding structure on X does not imply that W has that structure.

“We cannot assume that the properties of X correspond to properties of the objective world W. In other words, if we find some structure on X, it does not follow from this that W necessarily has that structure as well.”

May combine two claims.

It is likely that veridical strategies never enter the playing field; they are so unfit that they are not worth trying.

“Thus, it's likely that veridical strategies never enter the playing field.They're so unfit that they're not worth trying.”

The quote only partly states this claim.

When a representational space has little relevant structure, there is evolutionary pressure to evolve X itself rather than only the channel to a fixed X.

“evolutionary pressure to evolve the representational space X itself, rather than just the perceptual channel to the fixed representational space X.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

In the standard Bayesian framework for vision, the likelihood of a scene is the probability of obtaining the image from that scene and measures how well the scene can explain the image; it is often defined by a projective or rendering map from 3D scenes to images, possibly with noise.

“The likelihood of the scene x corresponds to the probability of obtaining the image y 0 from scene x; it is therefore a measure of the extent to which scene x is consistent with-or Bcan explain^-image y 0 .”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

An obvious way to increase expected-fitness payout is to tweak the perceptual channel P_X while keeping the representational space X fixed.

“An obvious way to increase the expected-fitness payout is to Btweak^a perceptual channel P X appropriately while keeping the representational space X fixed.”

May combine two claims.

Our perception of space-time is analogous to a desktop, and our perception of objects and their properties is analogous to icons on the desktop; the language of space-time and physical objects is the wrong language for describing the true structure of the objective world.

“Our perception of space-time is analogous to the desktop, and our perception of objects and their properties is analogous to the icons on the desktop.Just as the language of desktops and icons is the wrong language for describing the true structure of the computer, so also the language of space-time and physical objects is the wrong language for describing the true structure of the objective world”

May combine two claims.

The standard definition of illusory perceptions is based on an incorrect understanding of perception and its evolution, because it assumes evolution shaped perceptions to be normally veridical, which it did not.

“The standard definition of illusory perceptions is, however, based on an incorrect understanding of perception and its evolution.It assumes that evolution has shaped our perceptions to be, in the normal case, veridical.But evolution has done no such thing.”

May combine two claims.

Payoffs and truth are different unless payoff functions happen to vary monotonically with truth.

“Payoffs and truth are different, unless payoff functions happen to vary monotonically with truth.”

May combine two claims.

It is possible but unlikely that the result that natural selection generically drives veridical perceptions to extinction is an artifact of unrealistic assumptions of infinite populations and complete mixing, because interface strategies can be tuned to the right information while realist strategies are necessarily tuned to the wrong information when payoffs are nonmonotonic.

“Possibly, but unlikely, because the core reason that interface strategies dominate realist strategies is that, when payoffs are not monotonic with truths, interface strategies can be tuned entirely to the right information whereas realist strategies are necessarily tuned to the wrong information.”

May combine two claims.

In the dispersion-free case, P is not a homomorphism of any structures intrinsic to W other than the event structure required for probability, so no structural relationships among our perceptions are literally true of the world.

“Second, P is not a homomorphism of any structures intrinsic to W, other than the event structure required for probability, so that no structural relationships among our perceptions are literally true of the world.”

May combine two claims.

We cannot expect in general that payoff functions vary monotonically with truth, because monotonic functions are a measure-zero subset of possible payoff functions and because homeostasis militates against them.

“But we cannot expect, in general, that payoff functions vary monotonically with truth, because (1) monotonic functions are a (unbiased) measure zero subset of the possible payoff functions, and (2) even if they weren't, the ubiquitous biological need for homeostasis militates against them.”

May combine two claims.

Reproductive success and veridicality diverge if the relevant payoff functions are nonmonotonic; they diverge with unbiased probability one.

“They diverge if the relevant payoff functions are nonmonotonic; indeed they diverge with unbiased probability one.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The prior probability in the standard Bayesian framework encodes the visual system's implicit knowledge from phylogenetic and ontogenetic experience that some scene interpretations are more probable a priori than others.

“The prior probability captures the visual system's implicit knowledge, based on phylogenetic and ontogenetic experience, that certain scene interpretations are more probable a priori than others.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

CEP does not assume that X equals W or that X contains somewhere a true description of the objective world.

“however, there is no assumption in our framework that X = W, i.e., that X contains somewhere within it a true description of the state of the objective world.”

May combine two claims.

It would be wrong to conclude that all perceptions are illusory; they usually guide our behaviors quite well.

“But it would be wrong to conclude that therefore all perceptions are illusory.They are not.They usually guide our behaviors quite well.”

May combine two claims.

In the dispersion-free case, the perceptual function P:W→X is not veridical in that X is not a subset of W, so none of our perceptual experiences are literally true of the world.

“First, X is not a subset of W, so that none of our perceptual experiences are literally true of the world.”

May combine two claims.

In CEP, X and Y are representational spaces, and neither is assumed to correspond to or be isomorphic to W.

“In CEP, X and Y are simply two representational spaces-neither is assumed to correspond (or be isomorphic) to W.”

May combine two claims.

The claim that perceptual estimates nearer the truth have greater utility than those wide of the mark is not true; fitness functions are more complex and rarely track truth.

“Thiswould be convenient, but unfortunately it's not true.Fitness functions are more complex and versatile than that and rarely track truth.”

• cites Geisler and Diehl (2002) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

We must take our perceptions seriously not because they reveal the true structure of the world, but because they are tuned by natural selection to fitness.

“We must take our perceptions seriously not because they reveal the true structure of the world, but because they are tuned, by natural selection, to fitness.”

May combine two claims.

Studies of perceptual evolution using evolutionary games and genetic algorithms render a clear verdict: natural selection discards veridical perceptions and promotes interface strategies tuned to fitness.

“Studies of perceptual evolution using evolutionary games and genetic algorithms render a clear verdict: Natural selection discards veridical perceptions and promotes interface strategies tuned to fitness.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The simplified evolutionary games and genetic algorithms discussed in the paper adequately model the evolution of human perceptual strategies.

May combine two claims.

Our perceptions have been shaped by natural selection to make it easier for us to act effectively in the world so that we can survive and reproduce; they have not been shaped to make it easy to know the true structure of the world but instead to hide its complexity.

“In similar fashion, says the interface theory of perception, our perceptions have been shaped by natural selection to make it easier for us to act effectively in the world, so that we can survive and reproduce (or, more accurately, so that our genes can survive and reproduce).Our perceptions have not been shaped to make it easy to know the true structure of the world but instead to hide its”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The simplified evolutionary games and genetic algorithms discussed in the paper adequately model the evolution of human perceptual strategies.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

There is some evidence of dedicated representations in the evolution of vision, such as dorsal versus ventral pathways in the primate cortex.

“Although there is some evidence of such dedicated representations in the evolution of vision (e.g., dorsal versus ventral pathways in the primate cortex), adopting this strategy indiscriminately can lead to quickly proliferating representational spaces-which would quickly become untenable.”

May combine two claims.

CEP differs from the standard Bayesian framework by separating W from X, introducing perceptual channels from W to X and Y, and introducing a fitness function on W.

“The CEP framework thus differs from the standard Bayesian framework for vision in three key respects: (1) it separates the objective world W from the interpretation space X (used in the Bayesian inference from Y to X); (2) it introduces perceptual channels P X and P Y from W to the spaces X and Y, respectively; and (3) it introduces a fitness function on W (Fig. 4b).”

May combine two claims.

A strategy tuned to truths would map 0-5 cans to one color and 6-10 to another, providing maximal information about true can number but no information about payoffs, and thus would fail to guide effective foraging.

“A strategy tuned to truths would see squares having between 0 and 5 cans as, say, red and squares having between 6 and 10 cans as green, so that the perceived color would be as informative as possible about the true number of cans.But such a realist strategy would provide no information about payoffs (since red squares would have the same expected payoff as green squares) and would thus fail to”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

A specific fitness function presupposes a particular organism, a particular state, and a particular action class.

“Recall that a specific fitness function f o,s,a presupposes not only a particular organism o, but also a particular state s, and particular action class a.”

May combine two claims.

The space-time and physical objects of our perceptions are a species-specific adaptation shaped by natural selection that allows H. sapiens to survive long enough to reproduce; they are not an insight into objective reality.

“The space-time and physical objects of our perceptions are a species-specific adaptation, shaped by natural selection, which allow H. sapiens to survive long enough to reproduce.They are not an insight into the nature of objective reality.”

May combine two claims.

In a more complex case with 30 genes and 10 possible colors, the search space has 10^30 perceptual strategies, and it is likely that a realist strategy would never appear in any generation because it has no selection pressure and could only appear by chance.

“But in a slightly more complex case, say where there are 30 genes and 10 possible colors, then the search space has 10 30 possible perceptual strategies, and it's likely that a realist strategy, with no selection pressures in its favor, would never appear in any generation, because it could only appear by chance.”

May combine two claims.

Reproductive success and veridicality are entirely distinct concepts; whenever they diverge, reproductive success trumps veridicality.

“Reproductive success and veridicality are entirely distinct concepts.Whenever they diverge, reproductive success trumps veridicality.”

May combine two claims.

Therefore, we cannot expect in general that natural selection has tuned our perceptions to truth; our perceptions are not expected to be veridical.

“Thus, we cannot expect, in general, that natural selection has tuned our perceptions to truth, i.e., we cannot expect our perceptions to be veridical.”

May combine two claims.

It is possible but unlikely that more realistic examples of perception, such as shape or color perception, would favor realist strategies; Monte Carlo simulations indicate greater complexity does not generally favor realists and increases the toll of their mistuning.

“Again, it's possible, but unlikely.Monte Carlo simulations indicate that greater complexity does not, in general, favor realist strategies.Instead the mistuning of realists exacts a greater toll as the complexity of the situation increases.”

May combine two claims.

G is not required to be a symmetry group of the world, and the world need not match what the observer sees.

“So,Gneed not be a symmetry group of the world: the world need not have the structure the observer sees.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is an objective world W with states that exists independently of observers.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The interface theory keeps the distinction that illusions are experienced by most normal observers in suitable conditions, whereas hallucinations are idiosyncratic, seen by one or a few, and context-independent.

“The interface theory still says that hallucinations differ from illusions in Fig. 7 Necker cube that an illusion is seen by most normal people if placed in the right context, but a hallucination is an idiosyncratic perception seen by just one, or perhaps a few, individuals, and need not depend on the context.”

May combine two claims.

An organism may possess multiple PDA loops, which can be nested and interconnected in many configurations.

“a given organism can have many PDA loops, and its PDA loops can be nested and networked in an endless variety of ways.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

If the interface theory holds and selection gave humans a shared nonveridical interface, that would explain their agreement.

“if the interface theory of perception is correct, and natural selection has shaped H. sapiens to share a nonveridical interface, then that is precisely why we agree.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

A separate definition of illusion might come from mismatches between perception and measured world; this is a weaker notion, more like inconsistency between two measurement procedures.

“Discrepancies between perception and the measured world may provide a distinct way of defining illusions (cf.Gregory, 1997).We consider this a weaker form of Billusion^; it is more a lack of consistency between the results of two different measurement procedures.”

• cites Gregory, 1997 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Gibson denied that perception involves information processing, whereas the interface theory does not.

“Second, Gibson denied that perception involves information processing.The interface theory does not.”

May combine two claims.

Worldly mediation of the symmetry does not mean the world itself has it; the world's possession of that symmetry may be only the observer's conceit.

“That this is mediatedin the world does not imply that the world shares the symmetry: that the world has this symmetry could be merely a conceit of the observer”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is an objective world W with states that exists independently of observers.

May combine two claims.

That veridicality-only view is stronger than the interface theory's and false; it misunderstands evolution.

“This claim is stronger than that of the interface theory and is in fact false.It gets evolution wrong.”

May combine two claims.

The interface theory accounts for our not being fooled by conflicting behavioral recommendations and by trust in stereovision.

“The interface theory explains that stereovision invites behaviors at odds with those appropriate for a cube.This mismatch in behavioral advice, and our confidence in, e.g., the advice of stereovision, keeps us from being fooled.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. The quote only partly states this claim.

Adding an action space G to the CEP framework yields three Markovian kernels-perception P from W to X, decision D from X to G, and action A from G back to W-which form the PDA loop.

“As a result, we have three Markovian kernels-for perception, decision, and action respectively.”

• Also stated in: § Perception-Decision-Action (PDA) loop · plain

  “These three kernels therefore form a loop that we call the PDA loop.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is an objective world W with states that exists independently of observers.

May combine two claims.

Gibson held that evolution produces veridical perception of adaptively significant world features, making his view naïve realism rather than the interface theory.

“First, Gibson got evolution wrong: He claimed that evolution shapes veridical perceptions of those aspects of the world that have adaptive significance for us.Thus Gibson proposed naïve realism, not the interface theory.”

• cites Koenderink 2014 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

For the interface theory, illusion cannot be defined by nonveridicality: every perception is fundamentally nonveridical, yet only some are illusory.

“according to the interface theory, illusory perception cannot be defined in terms of nonveridicality: indeed all perceptions are fundamentally non-veridical, but only some of them are illusory.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Koenderink (2014) concluded that the notion of veridicality is void and a major obstacle to understanding perception.

“leading Koenderink (2014) to conclude BThe very notion of veridicality itself, so often invoked in vision studies, is void^and BIt is a major obstacle on the road to the understanding of perception.^”

• cites Koenderink 2014 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

For hallucinations, the interface theory substitutes the idea that they fail to guide adaptive behavior for the textbook idea that they are nonveridical.

“it replaces the claim that hallucinations are nonveridical perceptions with the claim that hallucinations are perceptions that do not guide adaptive behavior.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Over the course of evolution, perceptual-motor interactions have played an important role in shaping perceptual mechanisms.

“Our claim is rather that, over the course of evolution, perceptual-motor interactions have played an important role in shaping perceptual mechanisms.”

May combine two claims.

Both the measured world argument and the consensus argument fail.

“Both arguments fail.”

May combine two claims.

Although the observer lacks individual knowledge of P and A, it can know the composite kernel AP mapping actions in G to perceptual representations in X, and the composite kernel DAP mapping X back to X.

“even though the observer cannot know kernels P and A individually, it can know the composition kernel AP from actions in G to perceptual representations in X.”

• Also stated in: § Perception-Decision-Action (PDA) loop · plain

  “Similarly, it can know the composition kernel DAP from perceptual representations X back to X.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is an objective world W with states that exists independently of observers.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

If a real distinction between normal and illusory perception is granted, new grounds for it and a new theory of illusion are needed.

“If we concede that there is a vital divide between perceptions deemed normal and illusory (which, e.g., Rogers 2014 does not), then we must find new grounds for that divide and construct a new theory of illusions.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The interface theory predicts that no object has any causal powers.

“no object has any causal powers”

• Also stated in: § Objection 6 · plain

  “The interface theory indeed makes both predictions.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is an objective world W with states that exists independently of observers.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

A plausible reason for carving W into odd subsets S_x is a fitness function that is nearly constant inside each subset but varies across them.

“one good reason would be a fitness function on W that happened to be constant, or roughly constant, within each subset S x but differed between subsets.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is an objective world W with states that exists independently of observers.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Evidence for information processing is now overwhelming.

“Evidence for information processing is now overwhelming.”

May combine two claims.

Interface Theory claims that perceptual properties of space-time and objects reflect characteristics of the perceptual interface and do not correspond to objective truth.

“Similarly, the claim of Interface Theory is that perceptual properties of space-time and objects simply reflect characteristics of our perceptual interface; they do not correspond to objective truth.”

May combine two claims.

Much evidence shows systematic weaknesses and dependence on fallible heuristics and biases.

“there is ample evidence that we have systematic weaknesses and rely on fallible heuristics and biases (Kahneman 2011).”

• cites Kahneman 2011Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Nonveridical perception would let us abandon a simple theory of perception, not scientific method.

“If this claim is correct, then we can discard a particularly simple theory of perception.But that is not to discard the methodology of science.”

May combine two claims.

Euclidean perception is not veridical; it represents fitness, the thing that matters for evolution.

“we see the world as Euclidean not because this perception is veridical, but because it suitably represents what matters in evolution: fitness.”

May combine two claims.

An observer lacks knowledge of where its perceptions originate in the objective world and of what its actions actually do there.

“just as the observer does not know the true source of its perceptions in the objective world, similarly it does not know the true effects that its actions are having in the objective world.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is an objective world W with states that exists independently of observers.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The PDA formalism applies to all organisms, not just humans.

“the PDA formalism just described applies not just to humans, but also to all organisms.”

May combine two claims.

The interface theory predicts that unperceived objects lack position and all other physical properties.

“no object has a position, or any other physical property, when it is not perceived”

• Also stated in: § Objection 6 · plain

  “The interface theory indeed makes both predictions.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is an objective world W with states that exists independently of observers.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

We may still propose theories and derive falsifiable predictions about observations.

“We can continue in the normal fashion to propose scientific theories and make falsifiable predictions about what we will observe.”

May combine two claims.

The resulting measured worlds use the same space-time predicates as perception yet lack its shortsightedness; Euclidean extension, for example, accommodates the vast moon-star distance.

“The measured worlds that result share the same predicates of space and time as our perceptions but don't suffer the same myopia: the Euclidean extension, for instance, easily handles the huge difference in distance between the moon and the stars.”

May combine two claims.

G's action on the world need not constitute a group action; fiber coordinates may map to any s′ in S_g.x, and the S_x sets may be arbitrary.

“Note that the action ofGon the world need not be a group action: the coordinatesin the fiber could go to any s′ at all in S g.x .Also, there is no requirement on the nature of the different S x : they could be anything at all.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is an objective world W with states that exists independently of observers.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The interface theory of illusion treats an illusion as a perception that does not guide adaptive behavior.

“This forces the interface theory of illusions to identify illusions as perceptions that fail to guide adaptive behavior (Hoffman 2011).”

• cites Hoffman 2011Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Spatial perception may just represent the fitness costs of moving about and similar actions.

“our perception of space might simply be a representation of the fitness costs that we would incur for locomoting and similar actions.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Unlike the interface theory, the textbook theory says perception guides adaptive behavior only when it is veridical.

“The difference is that the textbook theory, but not the interface theory, claims that perceptions guide adaptive behaviors because, and only if, they are veridical.”

May combine two claims.

Selection against veridical perception does not imply that every cognitive faculty is unreliable; each must be studied separately.

“This does not entail that all cognitive faculties are not reliable.Each faculty must be examined on its own to determine how it might be shaped by natural selection.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The utilitarian theory says evolution gave perception heuristics or tricks for recovering useful information about an objective physical world, and that successful tricks make perception veridical about useful aspects of reality.

“The utilitarian theory of perception claims that evolution has shaped perception to employ a set of heuristics or Bbag of tricks^, rather than sophisticated general principles.It claims that these tricks are employed to recover useful information about an objective physical world (a claim which the interface theory explicitly denies).Accordingly, when these tricks are sufficiently successful (whic”

• cites Braunstein 1983 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Ramachandran 1985;1990Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

Current physical theory and experimental data are consistent with both interface-theory predictions.

“Thus, both predictions of the interface theory are compatible with current physical theory and experimental data.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The world is much richer than the agent, so no action mapping A can be onto the world.

“The world is much richer than the agent, so it is clear that no A can be onto the world.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

There is a mind-independent world.

“there is a mind-independent world, but it almost surely does not consist of physical objects in space-time that are the targets of intentional content proposed by Coates.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

In the CEP framework, the interpretation space X in probabilistic inference is not assumed to be identical to the objective world W.

“In this framework, the interpretation space X in probabilistic inference is not assumed to be identical to the objective world W.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The interface theory is metaphysically neutral: it posits nothing about the world W except measurability in the probability-theory sense.

“The interface theory is metaphysically neutral, in that it does not posit anything about the world W other than measurability (in the probability-theory sense, rather than the scientific measurement sense).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

In the CEP framework, there is a fitness function f on W.

“Importantly, there is a fitness function f on W.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

There is no single, linear evolutionary sequence of perceptual representations; such sequences can branch out with multiple representations evolving in parallel while emphasizing different aspects.

“We do not imply, of course, that there is single, linear evolutionary sequence of perceptual representations.Such sequences can branch out, with possibly multiple representations evolving more or less in parallel while emphasizing different aspects of the original representation (e.g., color, motion, and shape in the context of vision).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

There is no public Porsche.

“But there is no public Porsche.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Both people interact with the same objective reality.

“We both interact with the same objective reality, and we both represent our interaction with a species-specific set of experiences that we refer to as a car.”

May combine two claims.

Sense-data theorists said shapes, lightness, colors, and textures are seen directly without inference, but vision science now treats these properties as outputs of still-incompletely-understood computations.

“The shapes, lightness, colors, and textures of sense data were claimed to be seen directly and without intervening inferences.It is now clear that these visual properties are the end products of computations of such sophistication that they are still not fully understood (Frisby and Stone 2010;Knill and Richards 1996;Marr 1982;Palmer 1999;Pizlo et al. 2014).”

• cites Frisby and Stone 2010Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Knill and Richards 1996Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Marr 1982Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

If one's degrees of belief do not satisfy the axioms of probability and Bayes rule, then one can be the victim of a Dutch book.

“One can show that if one's degrees of belief don't satisfy the axioms of probability and Bayes rule, then one can be the victim of a Dutch book (e.g.,Jeffrey 2004).”

• cites Jeffrey 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

The interface theory does not imply that perception is an act whose objects are sense data, nor that sense data provide an incorrigible foundation for verified knowledge.

“The interface theory does not entail that perception is an act whose objects are sense data or that sense data are an incorrigible foundation for an edifice of verified knowledge.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

We can meaningfully consider ascending sequences within the larger lattice of evolving representations.

“We can nevertheless meaningfully consider ascending sequences within this larger lattice of evolving representations.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The authors interpret X as the possible phenomenal states of the observer.

“With this proviso, we interpret X as the possible phenomenal states of the observer, and we interpret a specific x∈X not in terms of an act-object relation as proposed by the sensedatum theory, but as a specific phenomenal aspect or constituent of the observer's mind; ours is a one-place account rather than the two-place account of the sense datum theory.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The authors' interpretation is much like the critical realist interpretation of Coates (2007).

“In this regard, our interpretation is much like the critical realist interpretation of Coates (2007).”

• cites Coates (2007) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Object permanence belief appears by about 3 months and is firmly established by 18 months.

“Belief in Bobject permanence,^the belief, e.g., that a doll still exists and has a position even when it's hidden behind a pillow, begins as early as 3 months postpartum and is wellensconced by age 18 months (Bower 1974;Baillargeon and DeVos 1991;Piaget 1954).”

• cites Bower 1974Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Baillargeon and DeVos 1991 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Piaget 1954 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

The interface theory is not a sense-datum theory and does not require sense data or sensibilia to exist.

“No, the interface theory is not a sense-datum theory and does not entail the existence of the sense data, or sensibilia, posited by such theories.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

In the CEP framework, perceptual channels from W to representational spaces X and Y are tuned to increase expected-fitness payout to the organism.

“The perceptual channels from W to the perceptual representational spaces X and Y are Btuned^to increase expected-fitness payout to the organism”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The interface theory is a general but mathematically precise theory of perception and action.

“The interface theory is a general, but mathematically precise, theory of perception and action.”

May combine two claims.

Objective reality is not a car and does not remotely resemble a car.

“But the objective reality is not a car and doesn't remotely resemble a car; moreover, the car of your experience is distinct from the car of my experience.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

By six months, children show rich causal interpretations of physical objects.

“Rich causal interpretations of physical objects are evident in children by age 6 months (Carey 2009;Keil 2011).”

• cites Carey 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Keil 2011 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The assumption that neurons are public physical objects that exist unperceived and have causal powers is the starting point for almost all theories.

“Here the assumption that neurons are public physical objects that exist unperceived and have causal powers is the starting point for almost all theories, and is, we propose, the reason for the (widely acknowledged) failure of all such theories to solve the mind-body problem.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The authors interpret a specific x in X not as an act-object relation but as a phenomenal aspect or constituent of the observer's mind, making their account one-place rather than two-place.

“With this proviso, we interpret X as the possible phenomenal states of the observer, and we interpret a specific x∈X not in terms of an act-object relation as proposed by the sensedatum theory, but as a specific phenomenal aspect or constituent of the observer's mind; ours is a one-place account rather than the two-place account of the sense datum theory.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

What counts as a satisficing solution or sufficient increase in expected-fitness payout depends on factors including the ecological niche of the organism and its competitors.

“Of course, what counts as a satisficing solution, or Bsufficient^increase in expected-fitness payout, depends on a number of factors, including the characteristics of the ecological niche of the organism, and of its competitors.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

If I steal your car, I change objective reality in a way that injures you and rightly puts the law on your side, but the changed reality does not resemble a car.

“If I do steal it, I've changed objective reality in a way that injures you and rightly puts the law on your side, but the reality that I've changed doesn't resemble a car.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

When I see your car, I interact with an objective reality.

“When I see your car, I interact with an objective reality, but my experience of that reality as a car is not an insight into that reality, but is merely a species-specific description shaped by natural selection to guide adaptive behaviors.”