Language and consciousness

Abstract

This chapter provides an introduction to the philosophical tradition of phenomenology and its way of approaching issues about consciousness. Phenomenology grows out of the recognition that we can adopt, in our own first person case, different mental attitudes or stances toward the world, life, and experience. One can discern certain ambivalence in the phenomenological tradition regarding the theoretical and practical or existential dimensions of the epoche. According to Husserlian phenomenology, consciousness is intentional, in the sense that it aims toward or intends something beyond itself. Phenomenologists distinguish different types of intentionality. Another important part of the phenomenological account of intentionality is the distinction among signitive, pictorial, and perceptual intentionalities. In contemporary philosophy of mind the term 'phenomenal consciousness' refers to mental states that have a subjective and experiential character. The phenomenological analyses of embodiment and perception are relevant to current trends in cognitive science.