CoChat

Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Some Conceptual Issues

Open access
Tushnet, Mark · 2013 · Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes
Cited by 169

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Legal scholars and political theorists interested in constitutionalism as a normative concept tend to dichotomize the subject. There is liberal constitutionalism of the sort familiar in the modern West, with core commitments to human rights and self-governance implemented by means of varying institutional devices, and there is authoritarianism, rejecting human rights entirely and governed by unconstrained power holders. Charles McIlwain's often-quoted words exemplify the dichotomization: “[C]onstitutionalism has one essential quality; it is a legal limitation on government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic government, the government of will instead of law,” and “[a]ll constitutional government is by definition limited government” (1947: 20–1). This chapter explores the possibility, perhaps implicit in a restrained understanding of McIlwain's formulation, of forms of constitutionalism other than liberal constitutionalism. After describing two possibilities – absolutist constitutionalism and “mere” rule-of-law constitutionalism – the chapter examines in more detail what I call authoritarian constitutionalism. That discussion is connected to recent literature in political science on hybrid regimes that have been labeled variously electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006) and competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010). The literature in political science is more concerned with the conditions for the emergence and stability of hybrid regimes than with normative issues, but some parts of the literature shed light on normative issues, as does the related literature on the functions of constitutions and courts in truly authoritarian regimes. Drawing on these literatures, this chapter outlines some characteristics of authoritarian constitutionalism understood normatively.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9781107252523.004

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Metadata

Authors
Tushnet, M.
Venue
Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes
Published
2013-12-30
Pages
36-50
OpenAlex
W1672176684
Cited by
169
References
1
FWCI
17.68
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Some Conceptual Issues. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9781107252523.004
The paper
Tushnet, M. (2013). Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Some Conceptual Issues. Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107252523.004

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.