On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy
Abstract
According to republican theory, we are free persons to the extent that we are protected and secured in the same fundamental choices, on the same public basis, as one another. But there is no public protection or security without a coercive state. Does this mean that any freedom we enjoy is a superficial good that presupposes a deeper, political form of subjection? Philip Pettit addresses this crucial question in On the People's Terms. He argues that state coercion will not involve individual subjection or domination insofar as we enjoy an equally shared form of control over those in power. This claim may seem utopian but it is supported by a realistic model of the institutions that might establish such democratic control. Beginning with a fresh articulation of republican ideas, Pettit develops a highly original account of the rationale of democracy, breathing new life into democratic theory.
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Epistemic domination fits the tradition of Republican domination, where freedom is defined as non-domination and domination is seen as the capacity for arbitrary placement of constraints on another party's choice set.
“Clearly, this fits the tradition of Republican domination, where freedom is defined as non-domination and domination is seen as the capacity for arbitrary placement of constraints one another party's choice set [41].”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [41]
Cites
Honig, B. (2001) · doi:10.1515/9781400824816 · Cited by 704 · see citing works
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A problem-based approach to democratic theory
WARREN, M. E. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055416000605 · Cited by 478 · see citing works
Ajunwa, I. (2020) · Big Data & Society · doi:10.1177/2053951720938093 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
Mollema, W. J. T. (2025) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-025-00801-w · Cited by 24 · see citing works
No Virtue Like Resilience: Machiavelli’s Realistic Justification of Democracy
Burelli, C. (2024) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00323217231191396 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
- Authors
- Pettit, P.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Pettit, Philip
- ORCID
- Pettit, Philip
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2012-12-06
- OpenAlex
- W4252817106
- Cited by
- 1,243
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 127 · 2025: 200 · 2024: 138 · 2023: 82 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 87 · 2020: 103 · 2019: 110 · 2018: 93 · 2017: 55 · 2016: 47 · 2015: 74 · 2014: 19 · 2013: 6
- FWCI
- 49.55
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Social Sciences › Education › Critical Theory and Political Philosophy
- Keywords
- republicanism, political freedom, state coercion, democratic control, domination, democratic theory, political institutions, Philip Pettit
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