Normal Science and its Dangers
Abstract
Professor Kuhn's criticism of my views about science is the most interesting one I have so far come across. There are, admittedly, some points, more or less important, where he misunderstands me or misinterprets me. For example, Kuhn quotes with disapproval a passage from the beginning of the first chapter of my book, The Logic of Scientific Discovery . Now I should like to quote a passage overlooked by Kuhn, from the Preface to the First Edition. (In the first edition the passage stood immediately before the passage quoted by Kuhn; later I inserted the Preface to the English Edition between these two passages.) While the brief passage quoted by Kuhn may, out of context, sound as if I had been quite unaware of the fact, stressed by Kuhn, that scientists necessarily develop their ideas within a definite theoretical framework, its immediate predecessor of 1934 almost sounds like an anticipation of this central point of Kuhn's. After two mottos taken from Schlick and from Kant, my book begins with the following words: ‘A scientist engaged in a piece of research, say in physics, can attack his problem straight away. He can go at once to the heart of the matter: that is, to the heart of an organized structure. For a structure of scientific doctrines is already in existence; and with it, a generally accepted problem-situation. This is why he may leave it to others to fit his contribution into the framework of scientific knowledge.’
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Anglo-Saxon critics have attacked the myth of the framework and the very idea of a conceptual scheme, focusing on the exaggeration of limits to communication; a solution to incommensurability lies in investigating the exaggeration of unlimited communication.
“AngloSaxon criticisers have attacked 'the myth of the framework'(Popper, 1970) or 'the very idea of a conceptual scheme' (Davidson, 1974). They focus on the exaggeration of limits to communication. A solution to the problem of incommensurability is to be found in an investigation of the exaggeration of unlimited communication.20”
From The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate (1996) · cites this paper as Popper, 1970
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate
Wæver, O. (1996) · International Theory · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511660054.009 · Cited by 335 · see citing works
Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience
Thagard, P. R. (1978) · PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association · doi:10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1978.1.192639 · Cited by 165 · see citing works
Scholz, R. (2017) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su9060991 · Cited by 117 · see citing works
- Authors
- Popper, K. R.
- Affiliations
- London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Popper, K. R.
- Venue
- Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1970-09-02
- Pages
- 51-58
- OpenAlex
- W2102403135
- Cited by
- 792
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 20 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 19 · 2012: 29
- FWCI
- 18.08
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Diverse Historical and Scientific Studies
- Keywords
- normal science, Thomas Kuhn, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, scientific paradigms, theoretical framework, philosophy of science, logical positivism
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review