Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 393

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

What is human agency?

Taylor, Charles·2012·Human Agency and Language

Abstract

I would like to explore in this paper what is involved in the notion of a self, of a responsible human agent. What is it that we attribute to ourselves as human agents which we would not attribute to animals? This question takes us very far indeed, and into several issues of capital importance in philosophy. I am not even going to try to sound them all. But I'd like to make a preliminary exploration of the terrain, using as my guide a key notion which has been introduced recently by Harry Frankfurt, in order to see how well the territory of the self may be mapped with its aid. The key notion is the distinction between first- and second-order desires which Frankfurt makes in his ‘Freedom of the will and the concept of a person’. I can be said to have a second-order desire when I have a desire whose object is my having a certain (first-order) desire. The intuition underlying Frankfurt's introduction of this notion is that it is essential to the characterization of a human agent or person, that is to the demarcation of human agents from other kinds of agent. As he puts it, Human beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices. They share these things with members of certain other species, some of which even appear to engage in deliberation and to make decisions based on prior thought. […]

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9781139173483.002

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 393

Metadata

Authors
Taylor, C.
Venue
Human Agency and Language
Published
2012-06-19
Pages
15-44
OpenAlex
W2462179241
Cited by
393
References
0
FWCI
127.47
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: What is human agency? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9781139173483.002
The paper
Taylor, C. (2012). What is human agency? Human Agency and Language. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139173483.002

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.