The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Abstract
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“These innovations exemplify what Ostrom (2015) terms “governance design principles”/; institutional arrangements that enable sustainable citizen engagement beyond individual leadership.”
From Transcending Boundaries: Sushma Swaraj and the Multidimensional Paradigm of Women's Empowerment in Political Leadership (2025) · cites this paper as Ostrom (2015)
In the citing paper
“This is the approach adopted in conservation biology, where crises observed across multiple contexts (e.g., ecosystem collapse, mismanaged commons) lead to an understanding of multiscaled dynamics yielding solutions that can be tailored to given sociological and ecological contexts (8, 47, 64).”
From Stewardship of global collective behavior (2021) · cites this paper as [47]
Citations
Cites
The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Global agricultural economic water scarcity
Rosa, L., Chiarelli, D. D., Rulli, M. C., Dell’Angelo, J., & D’Odorico, P. (2020) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.aaz6031 · Cited by 832
Ecosystem management as a wicked problem
DeFries, R., & Nagendra, H. (2017) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aal1950 · Cited by 578
The Influence of Formal and Informal Institutional Voids on Entrepreneurship
Webb, J. W., Khoury, T. A., & Hitt, M. A. (2020) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1177/1042258719830310 · Cited by 411
Globally representative evidence on the actual and perceived support for climate action
Andre, P., Boneva, T., Chopra, F., & Falk, A. (2024) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/s41558-024-01925-3 · Cited by 422
Stewardship of global collective behavior
Bak-Coleman, J. B., Alfano, M., Barfuss, W., Bergstrom, C. T., Centeno, M. A., Couzin, I. D., Donges, J. F., Galesic, M., Gersick, A. S., Jacquet, J., et al. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2025764118 · Cited by 289
Metadata
- Authors
- Ostrom, E.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2015-09-23
- OpenAlex
- W4253773297
- Cited by
- 965
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 127 · 2025: 141 · 2024: 101 · 2023: 85 · 2022: 80 · 2021: 117 · 2020: 95 · 2019: 61 · 2018: 87 · 2017: 43 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 5
- FWCI
- 52.59
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Global and Planetary Change › Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- commons governance, common-pool resources, tragedy of the commons, institutional analysis, state control of natural resources, privatization, voluntary organizations, meadows, forests, irrigation communities, water rights, fisheries, natural resource policy
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
