PHOTOGRAPHICALLY BASED KNOWLEDGE
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Pictures are a quintessential source of aesthetic pleasure. This makes it easy to forget that they are epistemically valuable no less than they are aesthetically so. Pictures are representations. As such, they may furnish us with knowledge of the objects they represent. In this article I provide an account of why photographs are of greater epistemic utility than handmade pictures. To do so, I use a novel approach: I seek to illuminate the epistemic utility of photographs by situating both photographs and handmade pictures among the sources of knowledge. This method yields an account of photography's epistemic utility that better connects the issue with related issues in epistemology and is relatively superior to other accounts. Moreover, it answers a foundational issue in the epistemology of pictorial representation: ‘What kinds of knowledge do pictures furnish?’ I argue that photographs have greater epistemic utility than handmade pictures because photographs are sources of perceptual knowledge, while handmade pictures are sources of testimonial knowledge.
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Citations
Cites
Grice, H. P. (1957) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2182440 · Cited by 2,824
Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science
Currie, G. (1995) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511551277 · Cited by 552
Factive Pictorial Experience: What's Special about Photographs?
Hopkins, R. (2012) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00800.x · Cited by 48 · cited 2×
“4 Notably, Abell (2010) argues against Cohen and Meskin (2004), Walton (1984) and elements of Hopkins (2012).”
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Cited by
The Epistemic Threat of Deepfakes
Fallis, D. (2021) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-020-00419-2 · Cited by 266
“Several philosophers (e.g., Walton 1984; Cohen and Meskin 2004; Walden 2012; Cavedon-Taylor 2013) have tried to identify the property of photographs that makes them epistemically superior to handmade drawings.”
BackgroundKerner, C., & Risse, M. (2021) · Moral Philosophy and Politics · doi:10.1515/mopp-2020-0024 · Cited by 75
Video on demand: what deepfakes do and how they harm
Harris, K. R. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03379-y · Cited by 68
“Moreover, deepfakes may have substantial deleterious effects in certain 8 In a paper on the epistemology of photography, Cavedon-Taylor (2013) argues that photographs convey perceptual knowledge, while handmade pictures convey testimonial knowledge.”
BackgroundDesigned to abuse? Deepfakes and the non-consensual diffusion of intimate images
Viola, M., & Voto, C. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-04012-2 · Cited by 43
“Cavedon-Taylor (2013, 2015) shifts the focus onto cognitive phenomenology, showcasing how the etiology of the beliefs we acquire via pictorial experience of photography is usually immediate rather than inferential.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cavedon-Taylor, D.
- Venue
- Episteme
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2013-08-07
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 283-297
- ISSN
- 1742-3600 (ISSN-L)
- 1750-0117
- OpenAlex
- W2324766677
- Cited by
- 40
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 2.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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