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Selectorate Theory in Hybrid Regimes: Comparing Hong Kong and Singapore
Open accessAbstract
This article investigates public and private goods provision in two hybrid regimes: Hong Kong and Singapore. We build on the selectorate theory, which analyses all regimes in terms of the size of their leaders’ support coalitions. This research follows a differences-in-differences design, with the exogenous political change in Hong Kong in 1997 as a treatment and Singapore as a control case. This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, as the aim of the selectorate theory is to transcend traditional regime typologies, a focus on hybrid regimes provides another test of the theory beyond the democratic–authoritarian divide. Second, the distinctive comparative set-up allows us to disentangle the effects of the size of the winning coalition from those of supporter loyalty. The empirical results demonstrate that whilst public goods increase with the winning coalition size, private goods provision is not affected unless accompanied by a change in supporter loyalty.
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“recent works show that the type and size of the ruling coalition play an important role when studying the public -private goods mix in authoritarian contexts”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Wong, 2017
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Cited by
Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity
Panaro, A. V., & Vaccaro, A. (2023) · Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica · doi:10.1017/ipo.2022.17 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Wong, M. Y. H.
- Affiliations
- University of Hong Kong (HK)
- Corresponding author
- Wong, Mathew Y. H.
- ORCID
- Wong, Mathew Y. H.
- Venue
- Government and Opposition
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2017-04-06
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 707-734
- ISSN
- 0017-257X (ISSN-L)
- 1477-7053
- OpenAlex
- W2605137159
- Cited by
- 4
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 1.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Government and Opposition (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- University of Hong Kong
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Keywords
- selectorate theory, hybrid regimes, public goods provision, Hong Kong, Singapore, 1997 handover, regime typology
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