The Logic of Political Survival
Abstract
The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.
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Public spending can be used to buy allegiance and reduce the risk that people will support challengers to the ruling elite.
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that public spending can be used to 'buy' allegiance and thus reduce the risk that the people will support challengers to the ruling elite.”
From The Ba'athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war (2015) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)
In democratic countries, politicians' fate is ultimately determined in electoral competition between parties or candidates.
“In democratic countries, politicians ' fate is ultimately determined in electoral competition between parties or candidates.”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In autocratic countries, political leaders' survival in office is dependent on ensuring the support of a much smaller coalition.
“In autocratic countries, by contrast, political leaders ' survival in office is dependent on ensuring the support of a much smaller coalition”
From Precaution and proportionality in pandemic politics: democracy, state capacity, and COVID-19-related school closures around the world (2022) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003
In a political system characterized by a small winning coalition and a large selectorate, members of the winning coalition have fewer incentives to defect and join opposition groups; thus, leaders prefer to distribute private goods over public ones.
“In a political system characterized by a small winning coalition and a large selectorate, members of the winning coalitions have fewer incentives to defect and join opposition groups; thus, leaders prefer to distribute private goods over public ones.”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
Autocrats' decisions on the distribution of public and private goods depend on the size of the ruling coalition relative to the size of the selectorate.
“Bueno de Mesquita et al . (2003) demonstrate that autocrats ' decisions on the distribution of public and private goods depend on the size of the ruling coalition -the segment of the population that supports the leader -relative to the size of the selectorate”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003
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“While our model of an authoritarian polity shares some features with Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) selectorate theory (see also Besley and Kudamatsu 2007; Haber 2007; Pepinsky 2009), we differ from most existing research in our explicit focus on the collective action problem that the dictator’s allies face when st…”
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InfluentialIs Democracy Good for the Poor?
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“Many studies claim to show that democraciesdo a better job than nondemocracies of im-proving the welfare of the poor (Boone 1996; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Dasgupta 1993; Franco, Alvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz 2004; Lake and Baum 2001; McGuire 2001; Moon and Dixon 1985; Przeworski et al. 2000; Sen…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialGartzke, E. A. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00244.x · Cited by 778 · see citing works
“…why norms, institutions, or other factors would inhibit conflict among rich democracies but fail to do so for poor democratic states.16 Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 2003) offer an elaborate and carefully constructed explanation in which 12Old democratic dyads appear about as dispute prone…”
BackgroundDoner, R. F., Ritchie, B. K., & Slater, D. (2005) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818305050113 · Cited by 712 · see citing works
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“In the terminology used by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 2002) elected leaders tend to be chosen by a larger “selectorate” and require a larger “winning coalition” than is the case with autocrats.”
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“In this paper, we focus on the internal structure of the most personalized dictatorships, especially those that have exhibited strikingly poor governance (for the most recent examples, see, for example, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Haber 2005; Linz and Stepan 1978). Why do dictators, who presumably fear that poor ec…”
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“Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) specific coding of W and S is as follows.”
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“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 2002, 2005) seek to account for these observed differences in political survival and war by examining the basis and nature of resource allocation.”
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“Then, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999, 2003) claim that members of the winning coalition support the incumbent if and only if (1 − gi) RiWi + µi + Vi(z) ≥ ci + Ri Si , (1) where Ri is the amount of resources in country i, redistributed among the winning coalition (of size Wi) if 1 Other rational…”
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“As Weingast (1997) admits, and as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and Acemoglu & Johnson (2005) emphasize even more forcefully, it is not the formal institutions that constitute the true check on executive discretion.”
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Limited Access Orders In The Developing World :A New Approach To The Problems Of Development
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“More recent political economy models of policymaking also make the Weberian assumptions, including Bueno de Mesquita et. al.”
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“Regarding the potential effects of age on regime change (during and after the cold war), I reproduced Geddes’s variables—age, age squared, and age cubed— that enable the logistic regression to test for curvilinear effects of time, including theories that the hazard rate declines after a ruler’s initial years in power…”
BackgroundBetter or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights
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“39 Rigged elections could also be thought of as cases of data manipulation (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013).”
Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China
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Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime
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Rightful Rules: Authority, Order, and the Foundations of Global Governance
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Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression
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African leaders and the geography of China's foreign assistance
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Ritter, E., & Conrad, C. (2016) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055415000623 · Cited by 223 · see citing works
“Aside from needing resources to please supporters who keep them in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), demands for change to the status quo outside of state-sanctioned political interactions can signal to interested observers that the regime lacks legitimacy (Davenport 1995).”
BackgroundConsultative Authoritarianism and Its Limits
Truex, R. (2017) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014534196 · Cited by 247 · see citing works
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs
de Mesquita, E. B. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000274 · Cited by 290 · see citing works
“A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation”: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001
Wood, R. M. (2008) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00512.x · Cited by 315 · see citing works
Leaders and International Conflict
Chiozza, G., & Goemans, H. E. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511996429 · Cited by 308 · see citing works
Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior
Hill, D. W. (2010) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381610000599 · Cited by 303 · see citing works
“Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that the amount of support leaders require to stay in power may be quite small under certain institutional arrangements.”
BackgroundDo Democracies Select More Educated Leaders?
Besley, T. J., & Reynal‐Querol, M. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000281 · Cited by 304 · see citing works
“[6] Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M.”
BackgroundThe Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear
Miquel, G. P. I. (2007) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00455.x · Cited by 300 · see citing works
To Repress or to Co‐opt? Authoritarian Control in the Age of Digital Surveillance
Xu, X. (2021) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12514 · Cited by 316 · see citing works
Harding, R., & Stasavage, D. (2013) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381613001254 · Cited by 311 · see citing works
“2Contributions to this voluminous literature include Blaydes and Kayser (2011), Ross (2006), Kudamatsu (2012), Besley and Kudamatsu (2006), Baum and Lake (2003), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Stasavage (2005a), Brown and Hunter (2004), Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2003), and Min (2010).”
BackgroundA Global Measure of Judicial Independence, 1948–2012
Linzer, D. A., & Staton, J. K. (2015) · Journal of Law and Courts · doi:10.1086/682150 · Cited by 305 · see citing works
“The ratio between the size of the winning coalition and the selectorate must lie on the unit interval ðBueno de Mesquita et al. 2003Þ.”
BackgroundPublic Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies
Tomz, M. R., WEEKS, J. L. P., & Yarhi-Milo, K. (2019) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818319000341 · Cited by 313 · see citing works
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Shepsle, K. A. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0002 · Cited by 355 · see citing works
Two Persistent Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness
Coppedge, M., Álvarez, Á. E., & Maldonado, C. (2008) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381608080663 · Cited by 308 · see citing works
“But our broader concept of inclusiveness also captures the size of the group—the selectorate—that chooses the executive or the legislature and holds them accountable (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
BackgroundSocial Policy in Developing Countries
Mares, I., & Carnes, M. E. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.071207.093504 · Cited by 306 · see citing works
Swedberg, R. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108762519.002 · Cited by 408 · see citing works
- Authors
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Georgetown University (US)
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2003-08-28
- Volume
- 1
- OpenAlex
- W1535643370
- Cited by
- 4,217
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 147 · 2025: 171 · 2024: 117 · 2023: 169 · 2022: 257 · 2021: 172 · 2020: 262 · 2019: 312 · 2018: 234 · 2017: 218 · 2016: 253 · 2015: 268 · 2014: 237 · 2013: 243 · 2012: 218
- FWCI
- 70.63
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Demography › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Keywords
- political survival, leadership selection, political institutions, resource allocation, public policy incentives, war and politics, economic development, political economy
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