Cited by 4,217Political Conflict and GovernanceCorruption and Economic DevelopmentCulture, Economy, and Development Studies

The Logic of Political Survival

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, Siverson, Randolph M., Morrow, James D.·2003·The MIT Press eBooks

Abstract

The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.

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Crossref · 10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001

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  • Public spending can be used to buy allegiance and reduce the risk that people will support challengers to the ruling elite.

    “Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that public spending can be used to 'buy' allegiance and thus reduce the risk that the people will support challengers to the ruling elite.”

    From The Ba'athist blackout? Selective goods provision and political violence in the Syrian civil war (2015) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)

  • In democratic countries, politicians' fate is ultimately determined in electoral competition between parties or candidates.

    “In democratic countries, politicians ' fate is ultimately determined in electoral competition between parties or candidates.”
  • In autocratic countries, political leaders' survival in office is dependent on ensuring the support of a much smaller coalition.

    “In autocratic countries, by contrast, political leaders ' survival in office is dependent on ensuring the support of a much smaller coalition”
  • In a political system characterized by a small winning coalition and a large selectorate, members of the winning coalition have fewer incentives to defect and join opposition groups; thus, leaders prefer to distribute private goods over public ones.

    “In a political system characterized by a small winning coalition and a large selectorate, members of the winning coalitions have fewer incentives to defect and join opposition groups; thus, leaders prefer to distribute private goods over public ones.”

    From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003

  • Autocrats' decisions on the distribution of public and private goods depend on the size of the ruling coalition relative to the size of the selectorate.

    “Bueno de Mesquita et al . (2003) demonstrate that autocrats ' decisions on the distribution of public and private goods depend on the size of the ruling coalition -the segment of the population that supports the leader -relative to the size of the selectorate”

    From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003

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Authors
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D.
Affiliations
  • University of California, Davis (US)
  • Georgetown University (US)
Venue
The MIT Press eBooks
Publisher
The MIT Press
Published
2003-08-28
Volume
1
OpenAlex
W1535643370
Cited by
4,217
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 147 · 2025: 171 · 2024: 117 · 2023: 169 · 2022: 257 · 2021: 172 · 2020: 262 · 2019: 312 · 2018: 234 · 2017: 218 · 2016: 253 · 2015: 268 · 2014: 237 · 2013: 243 · 2012: 218
FWCI
70.63
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The MIT Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Demography › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
Keywords
political survival, leadership selection, political institutions, resource allocation, public policy incentives, war and politics, economic development, political economy

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