Cited by 11Philosophy and History of ScienceEvolution and Genetic DynamicsEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

Adaptationism and Trait Individuation

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DiFrisco, James, Ramsey, Grant·2023·Philosophy of Science

Abstract

Adaptationism is often taken to be the thesis that most traits are adaptations. To assess this thesis, it seems we must be able to establish either an exhaustive set of all traits or a representative sample of this set. Either task requires a more systematic and principled way of individuating traits than is currently available. Moreover, different trait individuation criteria can make adaptationism turn out true or false. For instance, individuation based on natural selection may render adaptationism true, but may do so by presupposing adaptationism. In this article, we show how adaptationism depends on trait individuation and that the latter is an open and unsolved problem.

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  • The literature appears to be divided among accounts that individuate traits along structural or phenomenological features, adaptive functions, and pluralistic approaches.

    “The literature appears to be divided among accounts that individuate traits along (i) their structural or phenomenological features; (ii) their adaptive functions (selectionist approaches); and (iii) those that treat trait identification as mostly or entirely arbitrary or determined by specific research goals (pluralistic approaches) [39].”

    From Consciousness at sea (2025) · cites this paper as [39]

    The Introduction (section 1; page unavailable) identifies functionalism and structuralism as two broad frameworks for trait individuation, and sections 2–3 discuss selection-based and structural criteria. The paper does not present pluralistic approaches—trait identification as arbitrary or determined by research goals—as a third division of the literature. Its structural account also concerns factors that generate and structure variation, not simply phenomenological features. (LLM, conf=0.88)

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  • Whether a trait is considered an adaptation crucially depends on how the trait is individuated as well as how significant a role selection played in its history.

    “In a recent paper, DiFrisco & Ramsey [39] write that ‘whether a trait is considered an adaptation crucially depends on how the trait is individuated as well as how significant a role selection played in its history.’”

    From Consciousness at sea (2025) · cites this paper as [39]

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Lewontin, Richard C. 1978. "Adaptation." Scientific American 239 (3):212-31.

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Authors
DiFrisco, J., & Ramsey, G.
Affiliations
  • The Francis Crick Institute (GB)
  • KU Leuven (BE)
Corresponding author
DiFrisco, James
Venue
Philosophy of Science
Published
2023-02-17
Volume
90
Issue
5
Pages
1234-1243
ISSN
  • 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
  • 1539-767X
OpenAlex
W4321252231
Cited by
11
References
25
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 3
FWCI
9.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (submittedVersion)
  • Lirias (KU Leuven) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • The Francis Crick Institute (cc-by)
Funders
  • Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (12W1822N, G070122N)
  • Vlaamse regering
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
adaptationism, natural selection, evolutionary theory, adaptive traits, philosophy of biology

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