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Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory
Abstract
Rational choice theorists have not clearly articulated their epistemological positions, and for this reason, their arguments in favor of rational choice theory are inconsistent, contradictory, and unpersuasive. To remedy this problem, I describe how two of the main positions in the philosophy of science, instrumentalist-empiricism and scientific-realism, act as competing epistemological foundations for rational choice theory. I illustrate how these philosophical perspectives help political scientists (1) understand what is at stake in the theoretical debates surrounding the rationality assumption, self-interest, and methodological individualism, (2) identify inconsistencies in the epistemological positions adopted by rational choice theorists, and (3) assess the feasibility and desirability of a universal theory based on the rationality assumption.
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Cites
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BackgroundThe Aim and Structure of Physical Theory
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Cited by
Social Traps and the Problem of Trust
Rothstein, B. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490323 · Cited by 929
Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science
(2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511921452 · Cited by 611
How voters decide: information processing during election campaigns
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-2956 · Cited by 541
The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory
ROSATO, S. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000893 · Cited by 535
Students as Experimental Participants: A Defense of the “Narrow Data Base”
Druckman, J. N., & Kam, C. D. (2011) · Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511921452.004 · Cited by 454
Metadata
- Authors
- MacDONALD, P. K.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2003-11
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 551-565
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2129955465
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 50.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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