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Cited by 163

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Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory

MacDONALD, PAUL K.·2003·American Political Science Review

Abstract

Rational choice theorists have not clearly articulated their epistemological positions, and for this reason, their arguments in favor of rational choice theory are inconsistent, contradictory, and unpersuasive. To remedy this problem, I describe how two of the main positions in the philosophy of science, instrumentalist-empiricism and scientific-realism, act as competing epistemological foundations for rational choice theory. I illustrate how these philosophical perspectives help political scientists (1) understand what is at stake in the theoretical debates surrounding the rationality assumption, self-interest, and methodological individualism, (2) identify inconsistencies in the epistemological positions adopted by rational choice theorists, and (3) assess the feasibility and desirability of a universal theory based on the rationality assumption.

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Metadata

Authors
MacDONALD, P. K.
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
2003-11
Volume
97
Issue
4
Pages
551-565
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W2129955465
Cited by
163
References
8
FWCI
50.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s000305540300087x
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MacDONALD, P. K. (2003). Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s000305540300087x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.