The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Paradox of “Warlord” Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation
Abstract
Political theorists from Machiavelli to Huntington have denied the possibility of popular government arising out of the chaos of civil war, instead prescribing an intermediate stage of one-man rule by a Prince, Leviathan, or a military dictator. Based on recent empirical evidence of post-civil war democratization in El Salvador, Mozambique, and elsewhere, I show that democracy can arise directly from anarchy. Predatory warring factions choose the citizenry and democratic procedures over a Leviathan when (1) their economic interests depend on productive investment by the citizens, (2) citizens' political preferences ensure that power allocation will be less biased under democracy than under a Leviathan, and (3) there is an external agency (e.g., the United Nations) that mediates and supervises joint disarmament and state-building. Ultimately, I discuss the implications of this argument for the basic intuitions of classical political theory and contemporary social theory regarding democratization and authoritarianism.
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Cites
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy
Lipset, S. M. (1959) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1951731 · Cited by 7,050
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe
Ertman, T. (1997) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511529016 · Cited by 988
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From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda
BLATTMAN, C. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409090212 · Cited by 898
Political Order and One-Party Rule
Magaloni, B., & Kricheli, R. (2010) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220529 · Cited by 634
Power and political institutions
Moe, T. M. (2005) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592705050176 · Cited by 550
States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders
Staniland, P. (2012) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592712000655 · Cited by 544
Metadata
- Authors
- LEONARD, W.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2004-02
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 17-33
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2021981533
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 22.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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