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Cited by 5,300Historical Economic and Social StudiesEconomic Theory and InstitutionsLegal and Constitutional Studies

Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England

North, Douglass C., Weingast, Barry R.·1989·The Journal of Economic History
DOI 10.1017/s0022050700009451
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Abstract

The article studies the evolution of the constitutional arrangements in seventeenth-century England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It focuses on the relationship between institutions and the behavior of the government and interprets the institutional changes on the basis of the goals of the winners—secure property rights, protection of their wealth, and the elimination of confiscatory government. We argue that the new institutions allowed the government to commit credibly to upholding property rights. Their success was remarkable, as the evidence from capital markets shows.

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Crossref · 10.1017/s0022050700009451

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  • An economy will grow faster if a monarch can credibly commit to refrain from expropriating an excessive amount of wealth.

    “The economy of a country will grow faster, for instance, if a monarch can credibly commit himself to refrain from expropriaung an excessive amount of the hard-earned wealth of his subjects (North and Weingast 1989).”

    From Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics (2000) · cites this paper as North and Weingast 1989

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Authors
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R.
Affiliations
  • Washington University in St. Louis (US)
  • Hoover Institution (US)
ORCID
Weingast, Barry R.
Venue
The Journal of Economic History
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
1989-12
Volume
49
Issue
4
Pages
803-832
ISSN
  • 0022-0507 (ISSN-L)
  • 1471-6372
DOI
10.1017/s0022050700009451
OpenAlex
W2060948512
Cited by
5,300
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 143 · 2025: 204 · 2024: 232 · 2023: 196 · 2022: 227 · 2021: 272 · 2020: 334 · 2019: 346 · 2018: 241 · 2017: 213 · 2016: 189 · 2015: 220 · 2014: 188 · 2013: 192 · 2012: 202
FWCI
23.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 7032 d)
Locations
  • The Journal of Economic History (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Social Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Legal and Constitutional Studies
Keywords
Glorious Revolution, constitutional evolution, public choice theory, government commitment, credible commitment, property rights, capital markets, seventeenth-century England, institutional change, political economy of property

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