The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom
Abstract
This paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital, using the analogy of a “tournament” as a substitute for the ”race-to-the-bottom” model. Our key insight is that political costs that accompany legislating have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood and scale of reforms. While countries with higher political costs are less likely themselves to enact reforms, the presence of these costs also reduces competing countries' incentives to reform regardless of their own political costs. Domestic politics therefore mitigates the pressures for downward convergence of tax policy despite increased capital mobility. We examine the capital tax policies in OECD countries during the period from 1980 to 1997 and find that states are sensitive to tax reforms in competitor countries, although their responses to reforms are mediated by their own domestic costs to reform. We define two potential sources of political costs of reform: transaction costs, due to the presence of multiple veto players in the legislative process, and constituency costs, due to ideological opposition to policy changes that benefit capital. Our evidence reveals that a reduction in these costs either domestically or abroad increases the likelihood that a country enacts tax reforms.
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Citations
Cites
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage
Porter, P. K., Hall, P., & Soskice, D. (2003) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/30040740 · Cited by 7,510
Markowitz, H. (1952) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01525.x · Cited by 5,641
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261010 · Cited by 4,560
Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work
Tsebelis, G. (2002) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400831456 · Cited by 3,482
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400269712 · Cited by 3,368
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy
Strange, S. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511559143 · Cited by 3,339
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1979) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0401 · Cited by 3,033
Tsebelis, G. (1995) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123400007225 · Cited by 2,605
Cited by
The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
Treisman, D. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619151 · Cited by 800
Who Learns from What in Policy Diffusion Processes?
Gilardi, F. (2010) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00452.x · Cited by 580
Regulatory Competition and Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?
Konisky, D. M. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00285.x · Cited by 489
Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies
Gilardi, F. (2013) · Handbook of International Relations · doi:10.4135/9781446247587.n18 · Cited by 333
Problems (and solutions) in the measurement of policy diffusion mechanisms
Maggetti, M., & Gilardi, F. (2016) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x1400035x · Cited by 290
Metadata
- Authors
- BASINGER, S. J., & HALLERBERG, M.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2004-05
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 261-276
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2169071529
- Cited by
- 337
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 36.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.