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Cited by 389

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancingin Parliamentary Elections

KEDAR, ORIT·2005·American Political Science Review

Abstract

This work develops and tests a theory of voter choice in parliamentary elections. I demonstrate that voters are concerned with policy outcomes and hence incorporate the way institutions convert votes to policy into their choices. Since policy is often the result of institutionalized multiparty bargaining and thus votes are watered down by power-sharing, voters often compensate for this watering-down by supporting parties whose positions differ from (and are often more extreme than) their own. I use this insight to reinterpret an ongoing debate between proximity and directional theories of voting, showing that voters prefer parties whose positions differ from their own views insofar as these parties pull policy in a desired direction. Utilizing data from four parliamentary democracies that vary in their institutional design, I test my theory and show how institutional context affects voter behavior.

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Metadata

Authors
KEDAR, O.
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
2005-05
Volume
99
Issue
2
Pages
185-199
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W2164123392
Cited by
389
References
28
FWCI
69.25
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancingin Parliamentary Elections. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0003055405051592
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KEDAR, O. (2005). When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancingin Parliamentary Elections. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055405051592

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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