The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite Accountability to Popular Government
Abstract
Modern republics neglect to establish formal institutions that prevent wealthy citizens from exerting excessive political influence and they abandon extra-electoral techniques traditionally employed to keep office-holders accountable. Inspired by Guicciardini's and Machiavelli's reflections on the Roman, Venetian, and Florentine constitutions, this article highlights three forgotten practices that facilitate popular control of both economic and political elites: magistrate appointment procedures combining lottery and election, offices or assemblies excluding the wealthy from eligibility, and political trials enlisting the entire citizenry in prosecutions and appeals. I present a typology of regimes that evaluates the wealth containment potential of various magistrate selection methods, and propose a hypothetical reform supplying the U.S. Constitution with a “Tribunate” reminiscent of elite-accountability institutions in pre-eighteenth-century popular governments.
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Boix, C. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804960 · Cited by 2,211
Cited by
Paradoxes of Constitutional Democracy
Olson, K. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00254.x · Cited by 286
Metadata
- Authors
- McCORMICK, J. P.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 147-163
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2037131379
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 61.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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