When Distance Mattered: Geographic Scale and the Development of European Representative Assemblies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 75 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Scholars investigating European state development have long placed a heavy emphasis on the role played by representative institutions. The presence of an active representative assembly, it is argued, allowed citizens and rulers to contract over raising revenue and accessing credit. It may also have had implications for economic growth. These arguments have in turn been used to draw broad implications about the causal effect of analogous institutions in other places and during other time periods. But if assemblies had such clear efficiency benefits, why did they not become a universal phenomenon in Europe prior to the nineteenth century? I argue that in an era of costly communications and transport, an intensive form of political representative was much easier to sustain in geographically compact polities. This simple fact had important implications for the pattern of European state formation, and it may provide one reason why small states were able to survive despite threats from much larger neighbors. I test several relevant hypotheses using an original data set that provides the first broad view of European representative institutions in the medieval and early modern eras. I combine this with a geographic information system data set of state boundaries and populations in Europe between 1250 and 1750. The results suggest a strong effect of geographic scale on the format of political representation. The broader implication of this result is to provide a reminder that if institutions help solve contracting problems, ultimately, the maintenance of institutions may itself depend on ongoing transactions costs.
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“many of the institutions that the bellicists claim were the inadvertent result of early modern warfare, such as taxation, courts, central administrations, or parliaments, arose long before the pressures of war supposedly made them necessary”
From Tilly Goes to Church: The Religious and Medieval Roots of European State Fragmentation (2024) · cites this paper as Stasavage 2010
Citations
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Cited by
States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints
Johnson, N. D., & Koyama, M. (2017) · Explorations in Economic History · doi:10.1016/j.eeh.2016.11.002 · Cited by 375
“Due to the costs of information, Stasavage (2010) observes that representative institutions functioned best in smalll polities.”
BackgroundBLAYDES, L., & CHANEY, E. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000561 · Cited by 276
“30 Stasavage (2010) and van Zanden et al. (2012) represent the two most comprehensive data sets of medieval parliaments.”
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“Qualitatively Reprtax is the 36 Stasavage (2010).”
Delivering Stability—Primogeniture and Autocratic Survival in European Monarchies 1000–1800
KOKKONEN, A., & SUNDELL, A. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305541400015x · Cited by 213
“…in this development, our findings complement the literature on European state building that has mostly focused on how autocrats co-opted elites and built strong states by creating parliaments (cf. Blaydes and Chaney 2013; Ertman 1997; Levi 1988; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2010; Stasavage 2010).”
BackgroundResultThe Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood
HARIRI, J. G. (2012) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055412000238 · Cited by 189
“27 Conceding control over taxation to a representative assembly was a credible commitment to fiscal responsibility, which facilitated access to taxes and credit (e.g., Levi 1989; North and Weingast 1989; Stasavage 2003; 2010).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- STASAVAGE, D.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- STASAVAGE, DAVID
- ORCID
- STASAVAGE, DAVID
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2010-11
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 625-643
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2317619870
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 76
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 12.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Social Studies
- Social Sciences › Development › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History › European Political History Analysis
- Keywords
- representative assemblies, geographic scale, state formation, political representation, contracting problems, transaction costs, small states, medieval and early modern Europe, state boundaries, institutional sustainability
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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