The DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 86 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization
Abstract
Existing political economy models explain the politics of trade policy using inter-industry differences. However, this article finds that much of the variation in U.S. applied tariff rates in fact arises within industry. I offer a theory of trade liberalization that explains how product differentiation in economic markets leads to firm-level lobbying in political markets. High levels of product differentiation eliminates the collective action problem faced by exporting firms while import-competing firms need not fear product substitution. To test this argument, I construct a new dataset on lobbying by all publicly traded manufacturing firms from reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. I find that productive exporting firms are more likely to lobby to reduce tariffs, especially when their products are sufficiently differentiated. I also find that highly differentiated products have lower tariff rates. The results challenge the common focus on industry-level lobbying for protection.
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Cited by
Bagwell, K., Bown, C. P., & Staiger, R. W. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20151192 · Cited by 122
Chains of Love? Global Production and the Firm‐Level Diffusion of Labor Standards
Malesky, E. J., & Mosley, L. (2018) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12370 · Cited by 107
Metadata
- Authors
- KIM, I. S.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2017-02
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-20
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2189138646
- Cited by
- 327
- References
- 86
- FWCI
- 58.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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