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Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy
Abstract
This article examines the relationship between the legislature and the public administration in postwar Italy (understood as the period from about 1948 through 1994). Italian public administration is normally characterized as badly designed and inefficient, and government performance is usually classed as poor. I argue by contrast that bureaucratic inefficiency, excessive legislation and widespread bureaucratic corruption were features of Italian public administration that were deliberately designed by legislators and intended to enhance the re-election prospects for incumbents by providing them with opportunities for extensive constituency service. The underlying incentives stemmed from the candidates' search for the personal vote, essential for retaining public office. Differences in the laws regulating the financing of political campaigns explain why excessive bureaucratization in the Italian context also resulted in extensive political corruption.
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Citations
Cites
Patronage revisited: The dynamics of information and reputation
Moss, D. (1995) · Journal of Modern Italian Studies · doi:10.1080/13545719508454907 · Cited by 24
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Metadata
- Authors
- GOLDEN, M. A.
- Venue
- British Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2003-03-17
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 189-212
- ISSN
- 0007-1234 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-2112
- OpenAlex
- W1992583230
- Cited by
- 265
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 108.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- GOLDEN, M. A. (2003). Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy. British Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123403000085
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