The DOI matches its Crossref record; 69 of the 69 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Clientelism
Abstract
Clientelism is characterized by the combination of particularistic targeting and contingency-based exchange. This method of contingent exchange thrives in both autocracies and democracies. It exists in a large variety of cultural contexts. Confronted with economic development, clientelism fades away in some political contexts but adapts and survives in others. This article explores our understanding of the origins and dynamics of clientelism, focusing on the relationships between clientelism and democracy and between clientelism and development. It then evaluates the connection between clientelism and a variety of political and economic outcomes, including democratic accountability, corruption, and public goods provision. It concludes by outlining some remaining empirical and theoretical challenges and highlighting recent innovations in data collection and empirical methods.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Political Economy of Clientelism*
Robinson, J. A., & Verdier, T. (2013) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/sjoe.12010 · Cited by 554
Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes
Mares, I., & Young, L. (2016) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-060514-120923 · Cited by 332
Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215
MICHELITCH, K. (2015) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000628 · Cited by 186
How Personalist Parties Undermine State Capacity in Democracies
Li, J., & Wright, J. (2023) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140231169014 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Hicken, A.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2011-06-15
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 289-310
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W4213034237
- Cited by
- 832
- References
- 69
- FWCI
- 50.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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