The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How State Capacity Helps Autocrats win Elections
Open accessAbstract
Research has highlighted the role of the state in sustaining authoritarian regimes. But how does state capacity support autocrats during elections? The author argues that one specific aspect of state capacity – control over territory through the state apparatus – helps autocrats ensure large majority electoral victories. High-capacity rulers can rely on local agents and institutions to subtly manipulate elections, for instance by controlling the media or inhibiting the work of domestic election monitors throughout the territory while staying clear of costly manipulation such as election violence. In cross-national analyses of authoritarian multiparty elections from 1946 to 2017, the study finds that state territorial control increases the likelihood of large victories. Furthermore, high levels of state control correlate with subtle strategies of manipulation, including media bias and restrictions on domestic monitors – strategies that are also positively associated with large victories. At the same time, state control is negatively associated with election violence.
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“cross-national empirical research shows that state capacity affects the durability of autocratic regimes”
From Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity (2023) · cites this paper as Seeberg, 2019
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Citations
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Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511781353 · Cited by 3,459
Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse
HABER, S., & MENALDO, V. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000584 · Cited by 1,128 · cited 1×
“I also control for ongoing Civil Wars in certain models (data from Haber and Menaldo 2011) to ensure that the links between state control and large victories, and state control and election violence, are not driven by regimes in which a civil war has limited the government’s control over territory…”
Background
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity
Panaro, A. V., & Vaccaro, A. (2023) · Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica · doi:10.1017/ipo.2022.17 · Cited by 7
“…on the socioeconomic outcomes of an effective and capable state apparatus (Norris, 2012; Rothstein et al ., 2012; Fortin-Rittberger, 2014; Seeberg, 2014, 2019; Hanson, 2015, 2018; D ’ Arcy and Nistotskaya, 2017; Asadullah and Savoia, 2018; Dincecco, 2018) by showing that state capacity…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Seeberg, M. B.
- Affiliations
- Aarhus University (DK)
- Corresponding author
- Seeberg, Merete Bech
- ORCID
- Seeberg, Merete Bech
- Venue
- British Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2019-12-23
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 541-558
- ISSN
- 0007-1234 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-2112
- OpenAlex
- W2997409788
- Cited by
- 43
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 4
- FWCI
- 4.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- pure.au.dk
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified)
- Locations
- British Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- state capacity, authoritarian elections, electoral manipulation, territorial control, authoritarian regimes, election monitoring, media bias, electoral violence, electoral victory
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