The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Making and Keeping Peace
Abstract
Recent efforts to explain why some peace agreements last while others fail have focused on the strength of the agreement itself. Maintaining peace, even if both belligerents want peace, can be difficult if there are temptations to defect or there are reasons to fear that one may be played for the sucker. Strong agreements that can increase the costs of defection, enhance monitoring, or reward cooperation help to solve this enforcement dilemma and generally increase the former belligerents' incentives to remain at peace. Although we agree that such carrots and sticks can facilitate cooperation, we argue in this article that such measures will often be inadequate if the belligerents themselves are no longer committed to keeping the peace. If the belligerents believe that a renewed war can lead to better terms, peace will be precarious. We demonstrate that getting (and keeping) the terms right may be more important than any carrots and sticks incorporated into the document to enforce those terms. In particular, we show that “unnatural” ceasefires that come about as a consequence of third-party pressure are significantly more likely to fail. We also show that ceasefires negotiated after wars with consistent battle outcomes are more likely to last than those where the “right” terms of settlement are less apparent.
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Cites
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
Applied Survival Analysis: Regression Modeling of Time-to-Event Data
Hosmer, D. W., Lemeshow, S. A., & May, S. J. (2008) · Cited by 3,030
The security dilemma and ethnic conflict
Posen, B. R. (1993) · Survival · doi:10.1080/00396339308442672 · Cited by 1,420
The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement
Walter, B. F. (1997) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081897550384 · Cited by 1,083
Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post‐Civil War Conflict Management
Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2003) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/1540-5907.00022 · Cited by 709
Wagner, R. H. (2000) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669259 · Cited by 504
Luttwak, E. N. (1999) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20049362 · Cited by 474
Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables
Hartzell, C., Hoddie, M., & Rothchild, D. (2001) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081801551450 · Cited by 426
B ARGAINING T HEORY AND I NTERNATIONAL C ONFLICT
Powell, R. (2002) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.092601.141138 · Cited by 381
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
SLANTCHEV, B. L. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000911 · Cited by 367
Cited by
It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome
Cunningham, D. E., Skrede Gleditsch, K., & Salehyan, I. (2009) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002709336458 · Cited by 671
Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference
Gilligan, M. J., & Sergenti, E. J. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00007051 · Cited by 313
Swedberg, R. (2020) · The Production of Knowledge · doi:10.1017/9781108762519.002 · Cited by 293
Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes
Beardsley, K. C., Quinn, D. M., Biswas, B., & Wilkenfeld, J. (2006) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705282862 · Cited by 289
Metadata
- Authors
- Werner, S., & Yuen, A.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2005-04
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 02
- Pages
- 261-292
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2112756924
- Cited by
- 269
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 23.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.