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Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror
Abstract
I present a model of interactions between voters, a government, and a terrorist organization. The model focuses on a previously unexplored conceptualization of counterterrorism as divided into tactic-specific observable and general unobservable tactics. When there is divergence between voters and government preferences, strategic substitution among different modes of attack by terrorists and agency problems between the voters and government create a situation in which the politically optimal counterterrorism strategy pursued by the government in response to electoral and institutional incentives is quite different from the security maximizing counterterrorism strategy. In particular, in response to electoral pressure, the government allocates resources to observable counterterror in excess of the social optimum. This problem is particularly severe when governments put great weight on rent-seeking or care less about counterterror than do voters and when terrorists have a large set of tactics from which to choose. Voters can decrease the magnitude of the agency problem by increasing the benefits of reelection by, for example, slackening requirements for nonsecurity related public goods.
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Citations
Cited by
Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work
Ashworth, S. (2012) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823 · Cited by 535
The Political Economy of Terrorism
Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791451 · Cited by 362
Terrorism and Voting: The Effect of Rocket Threat on Voting in Israeli Elections
GETMANSKY, A., & ZEITZOFF, T. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000288 · Cited by 351
Defending against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources
POWELL, R. (2007) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055407070244 · Cited by 338
Metadata
- Authors
- Bueno de Mesquita, E.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2007-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 01
- Pages
- 9-36
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2004662869
- Cited by
- 160
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 36.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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