The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work
Abstract
Competitive elections create a relationship of formal accountability between policy makers and citizens. Recent theoretical work suggests that there are limits on how well this formal accountability links policy decisions to citizen preferences. In particular, incumbents' incentives are driven not by the voters' evaluation of the normative desirability of outcomes but by the outcome's information about the incumbent's type (e.g., competence or ideology). This review surveys both this body of theory and the robust empirical literature it has spawned. It concludes with a short discussion of ongoing work that attempts to integrate this theoretical perspective with a richer view of policy-making institutions.
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Cites
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Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
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Cited by
Retrospective Voting Reconsidered
Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-212920 · Cited by 667
Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China
Chen, J., Pan, J., & Xu, Y. (2016) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12207 · Cited by 636
Distributive Politics Around the World
Golden, M., & Min, B. (2013) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052209-121553 · Cited by 574
Explaining voter turnout: A meta-analysis of national and subnational elections
Cancela, J., & Geys, B. (2016) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.03.005 · Cited by 452
Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians
Avis, E., Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2018) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/699209 · Cited by 308
Metadata
- Authors
- Ashworth, S.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2012-06-15
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 183-201
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W2156774085
- Cited by
- 535
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 47.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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