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Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player
Abstract
A definition of ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) is suggested for games in which there are two types of player, each with its own set of strategies, and the fitness of any strategy depends upon the strategy mix, of both types, in the population as a whole. We check that the standard ESS results hold for this definition and discuss a mate-desertion model which has appeared in the literature in which the two types are male and female.
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Citations
Cites
The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts
Maynard Smith, J. (1974) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6 · Cited by 2,410
Cited by
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502
Schlag, K. H. (1998) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2347 · Cited by 820
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics
Börgers, T., & Sarin, R. (1997) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2319 · Cited by 737
The replicator equation and other game dynamics
Cressman, R., & Tao, Y. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1400823111 · Cited by 313
Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment
Archetti, M., & Scheuring, I. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.06.018 · Cited by 296
Metadata
- Authors
- Taylor, P. D.
- Venue
- Journal of Applied Probability
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1979-03
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 01
- Pages
- 76-83
- ISSN
- 0021-9002 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-6072
- OpenAlex
- W2041521953
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 8.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Taylor, P. D. (1979). Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player. Journal of Applied Probability. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0021900200046210
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