The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The replicator equation and other game dynamics
Open accessAbstract
The replicator equation is the first and most important game dynamics studied in connection with evolutionary game theory. It was originally developed for symmetric games with finitely many strategies. Properties of these dynamics are briefly summarized for this case, including the convergence to and stability of the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. The theory is then extended to other game dynamics for symmetric games (e.g., the best response dynamics and adaptive dynamics) and illustrated by examples taken from the literature. It is also extended to multiplayer, population, and asymmetric games.
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Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cressman, R., & Tao, Y.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2014-07-14
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- supplement_3
- Pages
- 10810-10817
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W1988769349
- Cited by
- 313
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 42.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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