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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The replicator equation and other game dynamics

Open access
Cressman, Ross, Tao, Yi · 2014 · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

The replicator equation is the first and most important game dynamics studied in connection with evolutionary game theory. It was originally developed for symmetric games with finitely many strategies. Properties of these dynamics are briefly summarized for this case, including the convergence to and stability of the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. The theory is then extended to other game dynamics for symmetric games (e.g., the best response dynamics and adaptive dynamics) and illustrated by examples taken from the literature. It is also extended to multiplayer, population, and asymmetric games.

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Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.1400823111

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Metadata

Authors
Cressman, R., & Tao, Y.
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2014-07-14
Volume
111
Issue
supplement_3
Pages
10810-10817
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W1988769349
Cited by
313
References
52
FWCI
42.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The replicator equation and other game dynamics. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1073/pnas.1400823111
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Cressman, R., & Tao, Y. (2014). The replicator equation and other game dynamics. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1400823111

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.