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Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings
Open accessAbstract
Legal rights of investors are recognized as an essential component of corporate governance. We assess the efficacy of these rights by examining board changes surrounding the filings of shareholder derivative lawsuits. We find that the incidence of derivative lawsuits is higher for firms with a greater likelihood of agency conflicts. We also find that derivative lawsuits are associated with significant improvements in the boards of directors. In particular, the proportion of outside representation on the board of directors increases. There is also some evidence that other board characteristics change favorably. These findings suggest that shareholder derivative lawsuits are not frivolous as is often claimed, but rather that they can serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism.
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Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
Cited by
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview
Gillan, S. L. (2006) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.11.002 · Cited by 875
Shareholder litigation and changes in disclosure behavior
Rogers, J. L., & Van Buskirk, A. (2009) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.04.003 · Cited by 376
Institutional monitoring through shareholder litigation
Agnes Cheng, C. S., He Huang, H., Li, Y., & Lobo, G. (2010) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.11.006 · Cited by 298
Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation
Brochet, F., & Srinivasan, S. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.013 · Cited by 265
Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits
BOURVEAU, T., LOU, Y., & WANG, R. (2018) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12191 · Cited by 263
Metadata
- Authors
- Ferris, S. P., Jandik, T., Lawless, R. M., & Makhija, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2007-03
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 143-165
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-6916
- OpenAlex
- W3123276728
- Cited by
- 206
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 22.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Ferris, S. P., Jandik, T., Lawless, R. M., & Makhija, A. (2007). Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109000002222
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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