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Cited by 16,243Corporate Finance and GovernanceCorporate Governance and LawCorporate Governance and Financial Management

A Survey of Corporate Governance

Open access
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W.·1997·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
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Abstract

This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x

Cites

257 of 257 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

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Claims other papers make about this one

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  • Disclosure regulation can mitigate dead-weight losses to the economy.

    “Finally, disclosure regulation can mitigate dead-weight losses to the economy.”

    From Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review (2021) · cites this paper as Shleifer and Vishny 1997

    In VIII. Conclusion (page unavailable), the paper describes disclosure rules as protections for minority shareholders. In B. Management Discretion (page unavailable), it says governance constraints can reduce inefficient misallocation. It does not specifically say that disclosure regulation mitigates dead-weight losses to the economy. (LLM, conf=0.78)

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  • In large corporations of most countries, the fundamental agency problem is not the Berle and Means conflict between outside investors and managers, but rather that between outside investors and controlling shareholders, who have nearly full control over managers.

    “In large corporations of most countries, the fundamental agency problem is not the Berle and Means conflict between outside investors and managers, but rather that between outside investors and controlling shareholders, who in particular have nearly full control over the managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).”

    From Investor protection and corporate governance (2000) · cites this paper as Shleifer and Vishny 1997

    Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

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  • Market size alone is not necessarily meaningful, as a small ISP may operate important infrastructure that allows it to control the traffic routed by other ISPs.

    “market size alone is not necessarily meaningful, as a small ISP may operate important infrastructure that allows it to control the traffic routed by other ISPs. 94”

    From Authoritarian collaboration and repression in the digital age: balancing foreign direct investment and control in internet infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as [94]

    The passages in IV. Large Investors and VIII. Conclusion discuss control of firms by investors, not control of Internet traffic by ISPs. Searches for ISP infrastructure and traffic routing found no passage in our copy addressing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.78)

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Self-check

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Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1995, Privatizing Russia (M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass.).
  2. Burkart, M., Denis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi, 1997, Large shareholders, monitoring, and fiduciary duty, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112.
  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procure- ment (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.).
  4. Megginson, William, Robert Nash, and Matthias van Randenborgh, 1994, The financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms, Journal of Finance 49, 403-452. · DOI
  5. Rajan, Raghuram, 1992, Insiders and Outsiders: The choice between relationship and arms-length debt, Journal of Finance 47, 1367-1400. · DOI
  6. Ritter, Jay, 1991, The long run performance of IPOs, Journal of Finance 46, 3-27. · DOI
  7. Shleifer, Andrei, and Lawrence Summers, 1988, Breach of trust in hostile takeovers, in A. J. Auerbach, Ed.: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequence (University of Chicago Press, Chicago), 65-88.

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Related

Authors
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
ORCID
Vishny, Robert W.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1997-06
Volume
52
Issue
2
Pages
737-783
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
OpenAlex
W3121693921
Cited by
16,243
References
257
Citations by year
2026: 516 · 2025: 675 · 2024: 644 · 2023: 744 · 2022: 695 · 2021: 767 · 2020: 841 · 2019: 792 · 2018: 726 · 2017: 701 · 2016: 762 · 2015: 800 · 2014: 838 · 2013: 784 · 2012: 802
FWCI
702.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor, 5435 d)
Locations
  • The Journal of Finance (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
Keywords
corporate governance, investor protection, ownership concentration, ownership structure, governance systems

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