The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Taxation, coercion and donors: local government tax enforcement in Tanzania
Abstract
This paper presents three propositions about tax collection by local authorities in Tanzania. First, revenue performance depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement. Reciprocity does not seem to be an inherent component of the state–society relationship in connection with local government taxation. Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. In particular, coercive tax enforcement is facilitated when the ‘bargaining powers’ with respect to tax collection favour the council administration, and the elected councillors have no direct influence on collection. Third, the presence of donors in a local authority may be crucial by changing the ‘balance of power’ in favour of the council administration, with implications for accountability, responsiveness and democratic development. These results may explain why widespread differences in revenue performance between local authorities are observed.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the Development Levy in Tanzania
Fjeldstad, O.-H., & Semboja, J. (2001) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(01)00081-x · Cited by 224
Self-citationDilemmas of Fiscal Decentralisation: A Study of Local Government Taxation in Tanzania
Fjeldstad, O.-H., & Semboja, J. (2000) · Forum for Development Studies · doi:10.1080/08039410.2000.9666122 · Cited by 86
Self-citation
Cited by
Revenues, State Formation, and the Quality of Governance in Developing Countries
Moore, M. (2004) · International Political Science Review · doi:10.1177/0192512104043018 · Cited by 568
Rural livelihoods and poverty reduction strategies in four African countries
Ellis, F., & Freeman, H. A. (2004) · Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220380410001673175 · Cited by 524
The Kilosa Killings: Political Ecology of a Farmer–Herder Conflict in Tanzania
Benjaminsen, T. A., Maganga, F. P., & Abdallah, J. M. (2009) · Development and Change · doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01558.x · Cited by 237
Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the Development Levy in Tanzania
Fjeldstad, O.-H., & Semboja, J. (2001) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(01)00081-x · Cited by 224
Self-citationTaxation and State Building: Towards a Governance Focused Tax Reform Agenda
Prichard, W. (2010) · IDS Working Papers · doi:10.1111/j.2040-0209.2010.00341_2.x · Cited by 114
Metadata
- Authors
- Fjeldstad, O.-H.
- Venue
- The Journal of Modern African Studies
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2001-06
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 289-306
- ISSN
- 0022-278X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-7777
- OpenAlex
- W2148762869
- Cited by
- 193
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 29.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Taxation, coercion and donors: local government tax enforcement in Tanzania. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0022278x01003627
- The paper
- Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2001). Taxation, coercion and donors: local government tax enforcement in Tanzania. The Journal of Modern African Studies. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x01003627
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.